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1. 42 U. S.C . §§ 12 131 -121 65 (1 994 ).
2. 29 U. S.C . §§ 70 1-79 4 (19 94).
3. S ee, e.g., Amos v. Maryland Dep ’t of Pub. Safety & Correctiona l Servs., 126
F.3d 589 (4th Cir. 1997); Crawfor d v. Indian a Dep’t of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 483
(7th  Cir. 1997); Torcasio v. Murra y, 57 F.3d 1340, 1342-56 (4th Cir. 1995); Randolph
v. Rod ger s, 9 80 F . Su pp . 10 51,  105 8-63  (E. D. M iss . 19 97).
4. S ee Pa ul V. Su llivan , Note , Th e Americans wit h Disabilities Act of 1990: An
Anal ysis of Title III and Applicable Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK  U. L. R E V. 1117, 1117
(1995) (not ing tha t  advocates  for the disabled lauded the Act for attem pting to quash
dis crim ina tion  ag ai ns t t he  ha nd ica pp ed ).
5. S ee id . Critics accused th e Act of being “ambig u ou s an d too far -rea chin g.”
Id .
6. S ee Amos, 126 F.3d at 589; Yeskey v. Pennsylvania  Dep’t  of Corrections, 118
F.3d 168 (3d Cir . 1997); Cr awford v. Indian a Dep’t of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481 (7th
Cir . 199 7).
875
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ L A N _F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
Bit ing the  Hand tha t  Feeds Them—Sta te  Pr isons
an d t he  ADA: Respon din g to Am os v. Maryland
Department of Public S afety & Correctional
S ervices
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 Presiden t George Bu sh  signe d t he Am erica ns  with  Disabili-
ties  Act  (ADA)1 into law on J uly 26, 1990. The Act wa s mea nt  t o
be a n ext ens ion of the Reh abil it a t ion  Act 2 wh ich a pplie d only t o
govern men t  contr actors and r ecipien t s of federal a ssist an ce.
The la ngu age of t he t wo s tatu tes is  nea r ly ide n t ica l a nd cou r t s
ana lyze cla im s u nde r  bot h  act s  in  a  s imi la r  manner .3 Propo-
nen t s of the ADA sa w it  as a  “decla ra t ion  of in de pe nde nce” for
disabled  citizens.4 Cr it ics , h owever , we re n ot  s a t is fi ed  with  the
language of the Act as ra tified by Congress and predicted a
flood of litigat ion because of the broad la ngua ge used. 5
As a r esu lt of th e Act’s br oad la ngu age a nd  res ult ing wide-
spr ead lit iga t ion , cou r t s h ave b een  forced  to de fin e t he Act ’s
limits. Wh ile  most  of t h e l it iga t ion  has  cen tered a round  the
employment  conte xt, w hich  is  cover ed  in  Tit le I I of t he Act ,
severa l recent  cases ha ve consider ed whet her  th e ADA applies
t o st a te p r ison  facili t ies . Th ree  case s a dd res sing t h is  pr ecise
quest ion were decided dur ing th e sum mer  of 1997 alone.6
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7. 126 F. 3d  589  (4t h C ir . 19 97).
8. 118 F. 3d  168  (3d C ir . 19 97).
9. 115 F. 3d  481  (7t h C ir . 19 97).
10. S ee Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 175;  Crawford, 115 F.3d at 487.
11. S ee 126 F.3d at  594.
12. S ee id. 
13. S ee id . at 595.
14. S ee id . at 605.
In  Am os v. Maryland Department of Public Saf ety t he
Four th Cir cu it  held  tha t  the ADA simply does  not  apply to s t a t e
prison  facilities.7 In  con t ras t , in  Yeskey  v.  Comm onweal th  of
Pennsylvania  Department of Correct ion s8 and Crawford v.
Ind iana Dep ar tm ent of  Correct ion s,9 ca ses  hea rd  in  the  Th i rd
and Seven th  Circu its  res pectively, bot h cour ts  held  t h a t  the
ADA ap plies in  t he  st a t e  pr i son  con text .10 Th e p r im ary con flict
between  the cir cu it s con cer ns in ter pr et a t ion  of th e ADA’s  broad
s t a tu tory lan gua ge an d wh eth er C ongre ss clea rly s ta ted  its
in ten t ion  in  the ADA to usurp st at e au thor i ty  and  thus r equ i re
its  appl ica t ion  to s t a t e p r isons. Furt her, if this was Congress’
in ten t , does Congr ess h ave t he a ut hor ity, wit hin  our  feder alis t
sys t em, to r egu lat e s t a t e governmen t s i n the  manner  pre scr ibed
in  the Act ?
In  Amos,  t he F our th  Circu i t  held tha t  the  language  of the
ADA d id  not  unm istakably  st a te whet her  the s t a tu tory
prov is ions apply to stat e prisons.11 The cour t  went on to suggest
tha t  even  if Congre ss h ad  st at ed wit h u nm ist ak ab le clar ity t ha t
the ADA appl ie s t o s t a t e p r isons , i t  doub ted t h a t  Congress  had
the power  to do so in a ccord an ce with  principles of federalism.12
The cour t just ified its  res ult  by relying on what  it deem ed to be
the pla in a nd  clear  te xt of th e ADA.13 I n  add it ion , t he  cour t
out lined  th e imp ort an ce of feder alis m,  sp ecifi ca lly  in  rela t ion  to
the business of runn ing state correctional facilities.14
These issues a re im por tan t  for  severa l  r easons . The recen t
de cis ion  in Amos cause d a  sp lit  among t he cir cu its , which
ma kes  it r ipe for  a S up re me  Cour t r ulin g. In  ad dit ion, t he
u l tima te answer  of whethe r  t he ADA a pp lie s t o st a te p r isons
will have s ign ifi can t  bear ing on  con temporary  unders tand ing  of
s t a tu tory cons t ruct ion /in terp re tat ion  gu idel ines and  fede ra li sm.
Fin ally,  applying t he ADA to sta te p ris ons p laces a  not iceable
fina ncia l stra in on stat e pris on  bud get s, em ployees, a nd
facilities.
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15. S ee Sulliva n, supra  note 4, at  1117.
16. 29 U. S.C . §§ 70 1-79 4 (19 94).
17. S ee Sulliva n, supra  no te  4, a t 1 119  (cit in g 29  U. S.C . §§ 70 1-79 4).
18. S ee i d . at 1120 (noting that advocates were dissat is fi ed  because  the
Reh ab ilit at ion  Act only covered “federal agencies and depar tments ,  federally-funded
programs, an d priva te se ctor em ployers t ha t cont ra ct with  th e feder al  gove rn me nt ”).
19. 42 U. S.C . § 12 101 (a)(8 ) (199 4).
Par t  II  of th is  Not e ou t lin es  the backgr ound and
development  of th e law rega rdin g application of the ADA t o
s t a t e pr isons . It  a lso summar izes  the con tours  of the  deba te
between  th e circuits rega rdin g the clear  sta tem ent  doctr ine an d
federalism. These gener al doctrines  and other related issues are
set forth a ccording to the curr ent la w.
Pa r t  II I gives  the fa cts of Amos and discusses t he a na lysis
used  by the  Four th  Ci rcu i t.  Pa r t  IV exp la ins  the cour t ’s
reason ing and a pp ra ises  the va lu e of t ha t  rea son in g in  ligh t  of
recent  cases on this an d re la ted i ssues . I t  sugges t s  tha t  the
logic proffered  by th e Amos cour t  is a ppr opria te  an d im per at ive
in  pr eser ving powers  reta ined  by  the s t a tes  under  the
Const i tu t ion . Pa r t  V concludes tha t  t he ADA shou ld not  apply
to sta te correctional facilities in complian ce with principles of
stat utory interpretat ion and federalism.
II. BA CK G R OU N D
A . The Am ericans With Disabilities Act—History, Purpose and
Function
 T h e ADA was  passed in  1990  i n  or d er  t o s a fe gu a r d t he
disabled  from wid es pr ea d d iscr im in a t ion .15 P r ior  to enactment
of th e ADA, Congres s pas sed th e Reha bilitat ion Act of 1973,16
which  prohibited  discrimina tion by government  con t ractors  and
the recipien t s  of federa l assist an ce.17 Advocates for th e disabled
wer e diss at isfied wit h  th is  lim it ed  pr otect ion  and lobbied  for  an
ext en sion  w h ich  u lt im ately  res u lt ed  in  the enactmen t  of th e
ADA. 18
In  out linin g th e goals  of th e ADA,  Congress  st a ted tha t  “the
Nat ion’s proper  goals r egar din g individuals with disabilities are
t o a ss u r e equ a lit y of opp or t un it y, fu ll part icipat ion ,
independen t living, a nd  economic self-s ufficie ncy for  su ch
ind ividu als .”19 Accordin g to Congr ess , ach ievin g th ese goals
would  provide “people wit h d isa bilit ies t he  opport un ity t o
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20. Id . § 121 01(a )(9).
21. S ee infra  Part  IV.A.1. for a discussion of relevant term s.
22. “Title  II  pr ohi bit s p ub lic en ti ti es  from  dis cr iminat ing against  qualified
individu als  with  disab ilities in  an y service,  progra m, or  activit y.” Sullivan , supra no te
4, at 1123 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 794(a), 12132 (1994)). “Title III proh ibits persons  who
own, lea se , lea se  to,  or op er at e pl ace s of pu blic a ccommodat ion from dis crimin at ing
against  individuals with disabi l it ies .” Id. a t  112 4 (cit in g 42  U. S.C . § 12 182 (a) (1 994 )).
23. S ee infra  Pa rt  IV.B.3  for  a  discussion  of the DOJ ’s int erpr eta tion a nd it s
relevance.
24. Ame ri can s with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 St at . 327) 601, 601. 
25. Id . 
26. Id . at 602.
compet e on  an equa l ba si s a nd t o pu rsu e t hose  opp or tun it ies  for
which  our free society is ju st ifiably fa mou s.”20 I n  add it ion  to
outlin ing  its goals for t he ADA, Congress cur sorily defined
te rms usefu l  i n  i n te rpr e t in g  the  scope of t he  Act .21 Congress
de lega ted  the t ask  of implementing Titles II and III of th e ADA
to the Dep ar tmen t  of J ust ice (DOJ ).22 Par t of the DOJ ’s
resp onsibilities in conn ection wit h t his  end owmen t of power is
to inter pret  th e sta tu te a nd set  limita tions on its en forcemen t. 23
 Pr esident  George Bush iss ued  a  s t a tement upon  s ign ing  the
ADA that  discussed the virtues and purposes  of t he  Act .
Referr ing to t he ADA he s ta ted : “It  pr omises  to open  up  all
a s p ect s  o f  Am e r i c a n  l i f e  t o  i n d i v i d u a l s  w i t h
disabilities—employment  opportun ities, govern men t ser vices,
p u b l i c  a c c o m m o d a t i o n s ,  t r a n s p or t a t i on ,  a n d
te lecomm un icat ions.”24 He  wen t on  to exp lain the rea sons for
exte nd ing the  reach  of the Rehabilitation Act and stat ed that
“[m]a ny of our  you ng peop le,  wh o have b en efit ed  [sic] from the
e qu a l e du ca t ion a l op p or t unity gua ra nt eed un der  t h e
Rehabil it a t ion  Act . . . ha ve fou nd t hem se lves .  . . s hu t  out  of
the ma ins t r eam of Ame rica n life.”25 He  concluded by s ta t ing
tha t  th e ADA “signals t he en d to th e un justified segr e ga t ion
and exclusion of persons with  disabilities from t he m ains tr eam
of Ame rica n life.”26
B . Developm ent of the Law: ADA in  the S tate Prison Context
 The development  of ma inst rea m disa bility la w is  of recent
v in tage sin ce th e ADA ha s only been in force since 1990.
Fur ther , disability law in  the p r ison  context  is  only n ow
em er ging.  Se ver a l cir cu it s,  however , h ave r u led  on t he
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27. S ee Amos v. Mar ylan d Dep’t of Pub. Sa fety a n d  C or r ectional Servs., 126
F.3d 589, 599-600 (4th  Cir. 1997). Th e court  in Amos s t a t ed  t h a t , “C on g r es s  m ust
speak clearly in  th e sta tu tory t ext wh en it  int ends  to alt er the t radi ti ona l ba la nce
between  the sta tes  an d th e feder al gover nm ent .” Id . at 6 00 (citing Torca sio v. Mur ra y,
57 F. 3d  134 0, 1 346  (4t h C ir . 19 95)).
28. 82 F . 3d 364, 367 (10th  Cir. 1996) (holdin g th at  sta te pr isons do n ot en gage
in  “pr ogr am s or  act ivit ies ” gover ne d b y t he  ADA).
29. 926 F.2d  994, 997 (10t h Cir . 1991 ) (hold ing  th at  a fe der al p ri son er  can not
invoke the Reh abilitation Act because the F ederal  B u r ea u  of Prison s does n ot en gage
in  “programs or activities” regulated by the Reha bilitation Act). In Amos ,  t h e Four th
Circuit  un ders tood th is to be a  “broad ru ling th at  sta te pr ison s ,  like the i r  federa l
coun te rpar t s , ‘ar e n ot s ub ject  to t he  Reh ab ilit at ion  Act b eca use  th ey do n ot s pon sor
“p r og r a m s or act ivities” as t hose t erm s ar e defined  in t he Reh abilita t ion  Act .’” 126
F.3d at  597 (quotin g Torcasio, 57 F.3d a t 1350). Wh ile notin g th at  th e Reha bilit at ion
Act  and the ADA are distinct,  the Fourth  Circuit seems to consider them so a l ike  as
to interchange them in ter ms of interpreta tion and definition of terms.
30. 857 F .2d  559  (9 th  Cir. 1988) (holding th at  th e Reha bilitat ion Act does ap ply
to st at e p ri son s).
31. 39 F. 3d  143 9 (9 th Cir . 1994) (considering how the Act is to be applied to
s t a t e prisons a nd det erm ining th at it  is not designed t o deal wit h  p r isons, bu t it  is
ap plicabilit y of the  ADA to s ta te p r isons, su gges t ing  the
con temporary  impor tance  of the  is sue.
1. Circuits holdin g that th e ADA does not apply to state
correcti onal  fa cil it ies
a. The Fou rth Circuit. The  Four th  Circu it h as  squ ar ely
held  that  the ADA does not apply to sta t e  pr i sons . In  Amos t he
cour t  st at ed t ha t: 1) st at e pr isons  ar e tr ad itionally ma na ged by
sta tes; 2) where Congress wan ts  to tr ead on t ra ditionally sta te-
ma na ged areas,  su ch a s st at e pr isons , it m us t s pea k wit h
unmistakable  clar ity; 3) Congre ss d id n ot sp eak  with
un mis ta ka ble cla r ity  in  the  pla in  l anguage of the  st a tu te ; and
4) th er efore, t he  ADA does not  ap ply t o stat e prisons.27 In
reach ing th is conclusion, th e Four th  Circuit em ployed the clear
s ta tement  rule of stat utory construction and r eferred to
tra ditional federalism principles.
b. Other circuits. The Tent h Circuit  ha s an alyzed whet her
the ADA applies  to s t a te p r isons in t wo case s, White v.
Colorado28 and William s v. Meese.29  Notwiths tand ing  the
differen t  factua l s it ua t ions , both  deci sions  a re cons is t en t  w ith
t h e Four th  Circu i t ’s  conclusion  tha t  the  ADA does  not  apply t o
s t a t e pr isons . The N int h Cir cuit  ha s en gaged  in s ome jud icial
gymna stics, origin ally h olding t he ADA app licable in  Bonner v.
Lewis 30 an d t hen  ret rea tin g in  Gates v. Rowland .31 Al though  the
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intended  for  gen er al  soci et al  ap pli cat ion ).
32. 84 F. 3d 2 46 (7 th  Cir . 199 6) (h oldi ng  th at  th er e wa s n o cau s e  of  a ction under
the ADA for  a d isa ble d s ta te  pr iso ne r w ho  wa nt ed  gu ar dr ai ls on  hi s b ed ).
33. S ee id . at 249.
34. Id . at 248-49.
35. The Seventh Circuit ultimat ely held t ha t  t he  ADA does  app ly  to s t a t e
p r isons in  Craw ford v . Indiana Depa rtm ent  of Corr ection s, 115 F.3d 4 81 (7th C ir.
199 7).  Howeve r, Crawford d id  not  overrule Bryan t . Chief Judge Posner ’s stat ement s
in  Bryan t  re flect  hi s op in ion , a t on e t im e, r ega rd in g a pp lica ti on  of the ADA to  st a t e
prisons.
36. In  addit ion to t hes e two circu its, t he E levent h Cir cu i t  br iefly men tioned  its
ag reemen t with  th e Nin th  Circuit ’s decision in  Bonner, in Harris v. T hi gpen , 941 F.2d
1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (agr eei ng  wit h t he  Nin th  Cir cuit ’s de cision  in  B o n ne r a s  t o t he
app li cab il it y of § 504 of t he  Reh ab ilit at ion Act  to s ta te pr isoner s ).  The  E leven th
Circu it ’s accor d wit h t he  Nin th  Cir cuit  is bu ri ed i n a  footn ote  as  dict um  an d is
r e levan t  only in that  the circuits agr ee on the int erpret ation of some l a nguage  in  the
Reh ab ilit at ion  Act which de als wit h t he scope of its cover age . See id.  at 1522 n .41.
37. 118 F. 3d  168  (3d.  Cir . 19 97).
cour t  did not sp ecifically sta te t hat  th e ADA does not  apply to
s t a t e p r isons , i t s r efusal to delineate th e circumstances under
which  it would apply suggests  a  m ove t owa rd a  hold in g of
ina pplicabili t y . The Sevent h Circuit  posed a st rong ar gumen t
for  ina pplica bility in  Bryant v. Madigan 32 but th en left th e door
open by not definitively decidin g th e issue. 33 In  Bryant, Chief
Ju dge Posner sta ted:
C ou ld  Congres s  r ea l ly  have  in ten ded  d i sab led  pr i soners  to  be
ma ins t r ea med  i n t o an  a l r eady  h igh ly  r e s t r i c t ed  pr ison  society?
Mos t  r igh t s  o f  fr ee  Am e ricans,  includ ing const i t ut ional  r igh ts
s u ch  a s  t h e rig h t t o fre e sp ee ch, t o th e fr ee  exe rcis e of r elig ion ,
a n d  to  mar ry ,  a r e  cu r t a i l ed  when  a s se r t e d b y p ris on er s . . . .
Even  i f t he r e  wer e  ( a s  we d ou bt ) som e d o m a in  o f a p p l ic a bi li t y
of t h e  A ct  t o pr ison e rs ,  th e Act  would n ot  be violated b y a
p r is on ’s  s imply  f a i li ng  to  a t t en d  to  t h e  m e d ical n eed s of its
d i sab led  p r i sone r s .34
Alth ough  th e court  did n ot defin itively r u le on t he is su e, th is
s ta tement  sheds s ome light  on the court’s opinion of whether
the ADA should apply to stat e prisons.35
2. Circuits holdin g that th e ADA does apply to state
correcti onal  fa cil it ies
 The Th ird and Sevent h Circuit s ha ve led the cru sad e to find
the ADA applicable to stat e prisons.36 The  Thir d Circu it
recent ly held  in Y esk ey37 that  the ADA applies to state prisons.
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38. Id . at  171 -72 (ci ti ng  28 C .F .R.  § 35. 190 (b)(6) (1 996 )).
39. Id . at 174.
40. 115 F.3 d 48 1 (7t h C ir . 199 7) (hol din g th at  th e ADA doe s a ppl y to s ta te
pr iso ns ).
41. Id . at 486.
42. Id .
43. Id .
44. S ee id . 
45. S ee infra  Par t IV.A.1.
46. S ee id .
The cour t r elied heavily on the r e gu l at i ons  set  for th  by the
DOJ , which list “correctional facilities . . . as  covered e nt itie s.”38
The DOJ ’s  in t erp ret at ion clear ly sup port s t he d ecision t o app ly
the ADA to s t a t e p r isons . However , th e cour t conceded tha t  the
op er a t ion  of p r isons  is  a  core  st a te  funct ion  and  recognized t he
menacing “specte r  of federa l cour t  managemen t  of s t a t e
pr isons ,” wh ich  wil l on ly increa se  if t he ADA app lie s t o st a te
cor rect ion a l facilities.39 This suggests som e ap pr ehe ns ion in
app ly ing th e ADA for fear  of overr e a ch ing federal involvement
in state functions.
The Sevent h Circuit  also recently r evisi t ed  whe ther  the
ADA applies  to s t a te p r isons  in  Crawford. 40 Chief J udge P osner
re t r act ed h is r eser vat ions voiced only one yea r ea rlier  in
Bryant, an d with  severa l concessions, decided to apply th e ADA
to st a te p r isons.  His  st ruggle t o ju s t ify th i s holding i s apparen t
in  the op in ion  wh er e J udge P osn er  acqu ies ces  tha t  exa ct
ap plicat ion of th e st at ut e, “might  seem  abs ur d.”41 He goe s on  to
s t a t e tha t  “th e spe cia l condi t ion s of t he  pr i son  sett ing license a
degree  of d iscr imina t ion  tha t  wou ld not  be tolerate d in a  free
en viron me nt .”42 He a ckn owle dged  tha t  “appl ica t ion  [of th e
ADA] to prisoners might produce som e  anom alie s.”43 Desp ite
these qua lms , th e court  held  t he ADA applicable to stat e
prisons u nder  th e langu age set  fort h in t he st at ut e.44
The basic confl ict  between  the circu its  dea ls pr ima rily wit h
s t a tu tory int erpr et at ion. Circuits holding th at  th e ADA applies
to stat e prisons liberally define the sta tut ory la nguage  wi thou t
consider ing th e consequ ences  of extend ing t he s ta tu te in  th e
face of Congressional silence on th e issue. 45 Those ci r cu i t s tha t
den y app lica t ion  t ake  the s t a tu tory  language  a t  face  va lue
because  of th e ba la nce of powers issues involved and th e
possible  e ffect  tha t  such  usu rp at ion of sta te  power  would  ha ve
on  th i s ba lance .46
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47. S ee Amos v. Maryland Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Correctional Ser vs., 126 F.3d
589, 590 -91 (4 th  Cir . 19 97).  In a dditio n  to  naming a s  defendan t  t he Maryland
Depar tmen t of Public Safety and Correctional Services, the plaintiffs also named
Richa rd La nh am , t he  Com mi ss ion er  of the Ma ry lan d Div ision  of Corr ect ion a nd  J ohn
P . Ga lle y, t he  Wa rd en  of th e Ro xbu ry  fac i li t y. In a ddit ion t o th e ADA claim, t he
p r isone r s al so a ss er te d t ha t t he ir  ri gh ts  un de r §  504  of th e Reha bilit a t i on  Ac t  were
violated  and  tha t  de fendan t s v io la t ed  the  E igh th  Am endmen t of the United St ates
Cons t it u t ion . See id.  at  591.  Th is N ote  will n ot d iscu ss t he  pr ison er s’ const itu t iona l
claims.
48. Id . at 591. Each inm ate a lso claimed specific harm s not outlined her e.
49. 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995). This decis ion w as  re nd er ed i n a n a ction
deter min ing if qualified im mu nit y would a pply. One  factor in  qua lified imm un it y
claims  is whether t he law is clearly established.
III. AM O S  V. M A R Y L A N D  DE P AR T M E N T  OF  PU B L I C  S A FE T Y  &
CO R R E C T I ON A L  S E R V I C E S
A. Th e Facts
 In  Amos,  thir teen disabled inmates at  t h e Roxbu r y
Cor rect ion a l In st itu tion  (RCI) b rough t  su it  cl a iming  tha t  p r ison
official s had  violated Title II of the ADA.47 The inm at es
specifically claimed that  defendant s:
(1 ) de n ied  th em  th e op por tu n ity  to p ar ticip at e in  wor k r e l ease
a n d  pr e-r ele a se  pr ogr a m s b eca u se  of t he i r  d i sab i l i t ie s ,
r e su lt in g in  a d en ia l of ben efit s, t r a in in g , a n d  r eh a b ilit a t ion ,
a n d  in  lon ge r  sen ten ces ; (2 ) den ied  th em equ a l  access  to
ba th rooms , a t h l e t ic facil itie s, t h e “hon or t ier ,” an d food
se rv ices  at  RC I be cau se  of t h e i r  d i sab i l i t ie s ;  (3 )  den ied  them
ad equ at e m edica l at te nt ion a nd  hy gien ic facilities ; (4) failed t o
m a k e  r ea s o n a b l e a ccom m oda tion s t o en su re  th e sa fet y of
d i sab led i n m a t e s ;  a n d  (5 ) a s s i gn e d  t h e m  t o  R C I be cau se  of
th eir  disa bi l i t ies ,  ther eby dep riving t hem  of  the opport un i ty  to
serve  th eir  sen te nce s a t a va ilab le facilit ies clos e r  to th eir
homes . 48
The d is t r ict  cour t  g ran ted  summary judgment  for  defendan ts
based  on  the  ea r li er  Four th  Ci rcu i t decis ion  in  Torcasio v.
Murray , w h ich  h eld that it  was n ot clearly established that th e
ADA applies to state prisons.49 In  just ifying its  decision , t he
cour t  in  Amos stat ed:
[W]e  a re  (an d  we  be lieve t ha t t he  Su pr em e Cou rt  will
u l t ima te ly fin d  i t self ) p e rs u a de d  in  n o s m a ll m e a su r e  by  th e
ext ra ord ina rily  cir cu it ou s  st a t u t or y  an a ly se s w h ich  t h os e
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50. Amos, 126 F.3d at  591.
51. S ee Tor cas io v. M ur ra y, 5 7 F .3d  134 0, 1 352  (4t h C ir . 19 95).
52. S ee Amos, 126 F .3d  a t  591. T he  cour t n ote d t ha t “[n]ot hin g in  th e opi nion s
of th ose  cou rt s h oldi ng  to t he  con tr ar y ev en  beg in s t o r efu te  th e ca re fu l ana lysis we
un der took  in  Torcasio.” Id .
53. S ee id . at 594-95.
54. United  S ta tes  v.  Bass, 404 U .S. 33 6, 34 9 (197 1); see also Gregor y v.
Ash cro ft,  501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (findin g  t h at fe der al cou rt s m us t b e su re  of
“Congress’ intent  before finding tha t federal law overrides” s t a t e  law);  Atascade ro
S ta t e Ho sp . v. S can lon , 47 3 U .S.  234 , 24 2 (19 85) ( st a t i n g t hat  Congress  must  make
it s intent ion to alter th e balance between t he Feder al and St ate governm ents
“unmis ta kab ly clear”); Rice v. Sant a Fe E levator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
( st a t ing that  Congress must m ake its mea ning “clear and m an ife s t ” i f i t  in t ends to
usu rp state powers). While all of the above cases, except for Gregory, were decided
on  the ba sis of 11th  Amen dme nt  imm un ity, th e Fou rt h Cir cuit n onet heles s app lies
the clear s ta tem ent  doctrin e espou sed in  th o se cases  to th e ADA to deter min e
c ou r t s  r each ing  th e  con t r a ry  conc lus i on  h a v e u n d e rt a k en  a n d
t h e con s i d er ab le e xt ra -int er pr et ive e n er gies  th at  th ose  cour ts
h a v e bee n for ced t o exp en d in  ord er  to lim it  th e sy st em ic cha os
t h a t  wou ld  o the rwise  ha ve  fol lowed  on  th e i r  ho ld ings  tha t
these  s t a tu t e s  app ly  to  the  N a t ion ’s  myr i ad  s t a t e  p r i sons .50
B. The Cour t’s  Reason ing
 In  a ffi r m in g s u m m a r y ju d ge m en t , t h e  Fou r t h  Cir cu it
revisited  its  decision in  Torcasio wh ich  su ggest ed , in  dicta , tha t
the  ADA does not  apply to stat e prisons.51 I n  add it ion , t he  cour t
car efully evaluated the post-Torcasio decisions  of oth er cir cu its
address ing  the issue, an d met iculously an alyzed th e ar gumen ts
for and a gainst application of the ADA to state prisons.52
The cour t en gaged  in t wo veins of an alys is in  reject ing
ap plicat ion of the ADA to st a t e  pr i sons , namely  a  ca re fu l
s cr u t i n y of th e la ngu age of t he s t a t u t e (s t a t u t or y
in terpre tat ion), buttr essed by a discussion of federalism
issues.53
1. Th e language of the ADA
 In  an alyzing th e langu age of th e ADA, the court  relied on
the clea r  s t a tement  doct r ine and  it s  rol e i n s t a tu tory
cons t ruct ion . The clear  st a t em en t  ru le p rovides  tha t  “[i]n
t r ad it i on a lly sen sit ive ar ea s, su ch a s legis lat ion a ffecting t he
federal  balan ce, the requ iremen t of clear s t at emen t a ssu res
tha t  th e legisla tu re  ha s in  fact fa ced, a nd  inten ded to br ing in to
i ssue, t h e crit ical m at te rs  involved  in t he  judicia l decision .”54
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wheth er  t he  Ac t  app li es  t o s t a t e pris ons. S ee Am os, 126 F.3d 5 89, 594-95 (4th C ir.
199 7).
55. S ee Amos, 126 F.3d at 594 (citing Torcasio v. Murra y, 57 F.3d 1340, 1344
(4th  Cir . 19 95)).
56. S ee id .
57. S ee id . at 595.
58. 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974) (“One of the p rim ar y funct ions of governme nt  is
the preserva tion of societal order thr ough enforcement  o f t he  cr imina l  law , and  the
ma in tenance of pe na l in st it ut ion s is  an  es se nt ia l pa rt  of t h a t  ta sk.”), overr ul ed on
oth er grounds by  Th or nb ur gh  v. Ab bot t,  490  U. S. 4 01,  413 -14 (1 989 ).
59. Torcasio, 57 F.3d at  1345.
60. S ee Amos, 126 F.3d a t 596 (citin g T orcasio, 57 F.3d at 1346). See infra  no t e
122 for s pecifi c effect s of a ppl icat ion.
The cour t  concluded tha t  the  ADA is so broadly written as t o
appear  “a l l-encompassing.”55 Accordin gly, th e court  bas ed it s
relu ctan ce to exten d a pp lica t ion  of the ADA to st a te p r isons on
the absence of a clear express ion of congres sional int ent  to
ab rogate st at e power s in  th e pr ison  cont ext .56 The Four th
Circu it  r ea li zed tha t  fede ralis m  concer ns a re t he basi s for  the
clear st a tem en t  doct r in e. Wit hout  the clear  sta tem ent  ru le,
cour t s would be  confront ed wit h a  const itu tion al is su e
regard ing Congress’ power to regulate st a t e-run facilities. In
Amos, th e cour t r equired Congr ess t o spea k wit h u nm ist ak able
clar ity  before i t would  enga ge in t he h ighly cont rover sia l
practice of apportioning state and federal powers.57
2. Federalism
 Perha ps th e st ron gest  an d m ost comp elling  a rgumen t
proffered  by the Am os cour t  i s the  impor tance  of sa feguard ing
the delicate balance between stat es and the  federa l
govern m en t . Torcasio cited Procunier  v.  Mar ti nez58 and
ass ert ed th at  “th e m a n agement of stat e prisons is a core stat e
funct ion .”59 Amos adopted this reasoning and concluded t h a t
the ADA en cr oa ch es on t he s ta tes ’ power  to overs ee t heir
prisons. Fu r thermore , t he  Four th  Ci rcu i t r ecognized the
s tagger ing e ffect  tha t  app lica t ion  of th e ADA would ha ve on
s t a t e prison budgets and security procedures.60 These effects,
combined  with  t r ad it i ona l not ions  of d is t inct ive  st a t e  a nd
feder a l powers,  form  the ba sis of Amos’ federalism  ar gumen t.
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IV. ANALYSIS
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61. S ee Procu ni er, 416  U.S . at  396; a nd  dis cus sion  supra  note 58.
62. S ee Atascadero S ta te  Hos p. v. S can lon,  473 U .S. 2 34, 2 42 (19 85); see also
Pennhu rst  Sta te S ch. & H osp. v. H alde rm an , 465 U.S . 89, 99 (1984). 
63. This  can on  de al s s pe cifica lly w it h t he  st at e of d isab il it y  law  unde r  t he
Reh ab ilit at ion  Act.
64. Ed uca tion  and em ployment  a r e two exa mples  of categories t ha t t he ADA is
mean t to re ach. In asm uch a s Congr ess h as de legat ed th e ta sk of imp lemen tin g the
ADA to the DOJ, a discussion of whether deference to an administr a t i ve  a ge n cy is
p rope r—including a review of the Ch evron  doctrin e—will be disc u ss e d  la t er. See infra
Par t  IV.B.3.
 The ADA provides that  people with  disa bilitie s sh ould be
given th e sa me  em ployme nt , educa t iona l , and  recrea t iona l
oppor tun it i es as t hose  wh o are n ot  simila r ly s it ua ted . As su ch ,
it  opera t e s t o eradicate discriminat ion against disabled persons.
However , th e scope of th e st at ut e is n ot clea r. Th e la ngu age
its elf is br oad a nd  overr each ing. Th ere fore, it is d ifficult  to
dete rmine ju s t  how fa r  t he  r egu latory  a rm is m e an t  to reach .
This  ambiguit y is  pr oble mat ic for  man y  reasons. State prison
management is  conside red  to be a  core  st a te  funct ion .61 As a
re su l t, if Congress intends t o usurp  th is  s t a te power ,  it  mus t
speak with  indisputa ble clar ity. 62 For  t h is  r eason , s t a tu tory
int erp ret at ion is an  imp ort an t a spect  of the conflict between  the
circuit s w h en  applying th e ADA. In ad dition, because st at e
prison  management  is  a  fundamenta l st at e power , th e pr inciple
of federalism cann ot be underst ated.
A. S tatutory Interpretation
  Four  canon s  of s t a t u t or y  i n te r pr e t a t ion  a re  in tegra l in
det e r m in ing whether th e ADA applies to state prisons. These
include the p la in  la ngu age or  t ext ua l ca non ,  legisla tive  his tor y,
Congress’ act ion or in act ion/silen ce  aga inst  the  backdrop  of the
law  before it s pas sage, 63 an d th e federalism  canon/clear
sta tem ent  doctr ine.
1. Plain language of the statute
 Nowhere in t he p lain  la ngu age of th e ADA does Congress
refer  to, or eve n s ugges t,  t ha t  s t a t e pr isons fa ll u nde r  any of the
categories tha t  the  Act  was  in tended  to reach .64 As  fu r the r
evide nce tha t  Congress  did not  in tend to apply the  ADA to s t a t e
pr isons or  pr isoner s,  one m ust  look  no fu r t h er  than  the
language i tself. Cou r t s d o not  agr ee  as t o the cla r it y of the
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65. S ee supra  Part  II.B.2 for a discussion of these decisions.
66. S ee supra  Part  II.B.1 for a discussion of these decisions.
67. 42 U. S.C . § 12 132  (199 4).
68. Id . § 121 31(1 ).
69. S ee C h urch of the H oly Trinity v. Un ited St ate s, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). Wit h
rega rd to st at ut ory lan guage, the Court stat ed “it is the duty of the courts .  .  . to say
tha t , however  broad  th e lan gua ge of the st at ut e ma y be, th e act, a lth ough wit hin  th e
l et t e r , is not  with in t he in ten tion of th e legislat ur e, an d th erefore  cann ot be wit hin
the sta tu te.” Id . at 472. In th e case a t issu e a lit era l rea ding of th e sta tu te could
suggest app lication , howeve r, H ol y T rinity sugges t s  t ha t  the  language  in  the  s t atu t e
migh t  not a lways be  int erpr eted  correctly. Th e Cour t goes on t o say:
The l anguage o f t he  act , if construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd
resu lt . If a  lit er al con st ru ction  of th e wor ds of  a  s t at ut e be  ab su rd , t he  act
must  be so construed as t o avoid th e abs ur dity. Th e court  mu st r estr ain  th e
words. The object d esigne d to be r eache d by th e a ct m us t li mi t a nd  cont rol
the literal import of the ter ms an d phrases em ployed.
Id . at  460; see also Unit ed Steelwork ers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 1 93,  201  (197 9).
ADA’s lan gua ge. Th e Th ird , Seven th , an d N int h Cir cuit s h ave
held  th at  th e sta tu tory langua ge establishes t ha t t he ADA
app lies to state prisons.65 The Four th  and  Ten th Circuits a sser t
tha t th e language of the ADA is vague and am biguous.66
The ADA s ta tes  tha t  “no qua li fi ed ind ividua l  wi th  a
disa bility  sh all, by r eas on of such d isa bilit y, be exclu de d fr om
pa rt icipat ion in or be denied t he ben efits of the services,
program s, or activities of a pu blic ent ity, or be subjected to
discr imin at ion by an y su ch en tit y.”67 This language  is  a  pr ime
exam ple of t he  t erms  tha t  must  be scru t in i zed in order  t o
decipher  the scope of th e st at ut e. The  st at ut e define s “public
en tit y” to include “any Stat e or local government” and “any
dep a r tmen t , agency, special purp ose district, or other
inst rumen ta l it y of a  S t a t e or  S t a t es  or  l oca l  governmen t .”68 At
first  b lush  it  would appear  tha t  sta te pr isons could fit un der
th i s definition. However, this broad de fin it ion  is  more of a
blank et  s t a tement  than a  clea r  declar at ion of inten t, it  is devoid
of any specification. Hence, it alone can not be considered t o
hold st a tes  res pon sible  for  app lying t he ADA to st a te p r ison
facilities. 69 In  ad dit ion, Title  II of th e ADA is ent itled  “Pu blic
Ser vices.” Th is tit le suggests  th at  Congress int ends t o bar
discr imin at ion in services provided  to the ge ner a l publi c.
Sim ply speak ing, prisoner s ar e not m ember s of th e gener a l
pu blic. In  fact, the ver y pu rp ose of a pr ison fa cility is t o rem ove
convict ed  cr im in a ls  from the ge ner a l publi c.
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70. 42 U. S.C . § 12 131 (2).
71. Brya n t  v. Mad igan , 84 F.3 d 246, 249  (7th  Cir. 19 96). S ee supra  Par t I I.B  for
a  dis cus sio n o f Bryan t  and Crawford.
72. Torcasio  v. M ur ra y, 5 7 F .3d  134 0, 1 347  (4t h C ir . 19 95).
73. Amos  v. M ar yla nd  Dep’t of P ub . Sa fet y  a n d Correctional Ser vs., 126 F.3d
589, 601 (4th  Cir. 1997) (quot ing Torcasio, 57  F. 3d  at  134 7).
74. 42 U. S.C . § 12 101 (a)(8 ).
75. Id . § 121 01(a )(9).
Addit iona lly, under t he stat ute, Congress defined a
“qua lified ind ividu al w ith  a d isa bilit y” as  a n  individual who
“meet s th e essent ial eligibility r equ ir em en ts for  the r ece ip t  of
services or  t he pa rt icipat ion in progra ms or a ctivities provided
by a p ub lic ent ity.”70 P r isone r s a re  not  commonly cons idered as
such . Those who apply the ADA to s t a t e p r isons  a rgue  tha t
p r isone r s are engaged in reha bilitation activities and
pr ogra ms —which  a re  prot ect ed by t he ADA. H owever , pr isons
do not  offe r  “programs or  activi t i es” a s  t hese t e rms a re
ord ina r ily un der st ood. The Seven th  Circu it n oted in  Bryant
tha t  “incarce ra t ion ,  which r equires  th e provision of a place to
sleep , is n ot a  ‘pr ogra m’ or ‘act ivity.’ Sleepin g in one’s cell  is  not
a  ‘progr am ’ or ‘act ivity.’”71 In  Torcasio,  the court noted t h a t
“[t]h e ter ms  ‘eligible’ an d ‘pa rt icipat e’ imply vol un ta r in es s on
the par t  of an  app lican t  wh o se ek s a  benefit  from the sta te; th ey
do not  b r ing to mind pr isoner s wh o ar e bein g held  aga ins t t heir
will.”72 Am os asser t s  t ha t  “‘most p rison officials would be
sur prised  to lea rn  th at  th ey wer e’ re qu ire d by t he ADA . . . to
provide ‘ser vices,’ ‘prog rams ,’ or  ‘act ivi t ie s’ a s  t hose t e rms a re
ord ina r ily un d er stood.’”73 Th e p la in  la ngu age of t he ADA is  not
so p la in. It  is at  least  ar guable t ha t one m ust  str etch t o read
prisons in to th e ter minology set forth  in th e sta tu te.
2. Legislative history
 Under  th e ADA, Con gr es s d es cr ibe d t he in t en t  of t he
s t a tu t e in th is way: “[T]he N at ion’s pr oper goa ls r egar din g
ind ividua ls with  disa bilities  ar e to a ssu re e qua lity of
oppor tun it y , full pa rt icipat ion, in dep en den t livin g, an d
economic se lf-sufficie ncy for  su ch  ind ividu als .”74 Congress t hen
outlined  the poss ib le  effect s  tha t  th is  s t a tu te cou ld have and
found tha t  t he s t a tu t e would afford “people with  disabilities  the
opportun ity to compete on an equa l basis and to pursue those
oppor tun it i es for wh ich our  free s ociety is ju st ifiably fa mou s.”75
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76. Id .
77. Ame ri can s with  Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990
U.S.C.C .A.N. (104 S ta t. 3 27) 60 1, 60 1. Alt hou gh  pr esi den tia l st at em en ts  ar e n ot
usu ally considered to be determina tive of the i nten t of a st at ut e, some cour ts h ave
used  them in  de t ermin ing  in tent . S ee Gomez v. I mm igra tion  & Na tu ra lizat ion Ser v.,
947 F.2d 660, 664-65 (2d Cir. 1991) (using th e Pre sident’s  sta tem ent  upon  signin g §
303 of the Im migr at ion an d Na tiona lity Act int o law to sh ow its  i n t en t  );  Ma in  Cen t .
R.R. Co. v. Broth erh ood of Main tena nce of Way Employees, 813 F.2d 484, 491 (1st
C ir . 1987) (referencing the r elevant legislative history to deter mine Congress’ inten t
in  passing th e Railway Labor Act, including the Presiden t ’s  s t a t emen t  made when  he
signed the Act into law); Missouri v. Andrews, 787 F .2d 270, 281 (8th Cir . 1986)
(ag ree ing wit h t he  dis tr ict cou rt ’s  r uling wh ich includ ed a d iscussion  of the legisla tive
h i sto ry an d p re sid en ti al  st at em en ts  up on  pa ss ag e of t he Flood Contr ol Act); Finley
v. Cowles Bu s. Media , No. 93CIV505 1 (PKL), 1994  WL 27333 6, at  *3 (S.D .N.Y.  June
20, 1994 ) (us ing  th e P re sid en t’s st at em en t u pon  signin g  the Amer icans  Wi th
Disabilities Act i nt o la w t o de fin e s om e of it s t er mi no logy ).
78. Ame ri can s with  Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 St at . 327) 601, 601. 
While  inca rcera te d, pr isone rs  do not  ha ve equ al opp ort un ity a s
tha t  term is normally defined in mainstream  society, they do
not  live  in de pe nde nt ly, a nd t hey a re n ot  econ omica lly s elf-
su ffi ci en t . Likewise, prisoner s do not live in our free society
which  necess a r ily  pr ohibi t s t hem  from “comp e[t in g] on  an  equa l
ba sis . . . for wh ich our  free s ociety is ju st ifiably fa mou s.”76
The stat ement ma de by President George Bush upon
sign ing the Act  in to la w in t im ates  tha t  th is  st a tu te was n ot
inten ded to apply to state prisons.77 On  tha t  occas ion , he laud ed
Congress for passing a law w ith  su ch posit ive, far -rea chin g
effect s for disa bled Americans. H owever, he comm un icated t he
limi t e d scop e of the  st a tu te  when  he s ta ted  on  two occas ions
tha t  the Act is me a nt t o inte gra te d isa bled citizen s in to
“mainst ream Amer ican  life.”78 Wh ile  th is  st a tem en t  is  not
dete rmina t ive of t he  st a tu t e ’s  in t en t , cl ea r ly  the  pr imary
purpose of incarce ra t ion  i s to pun ish  offenders by rem oving
t hem  from main st rea m societ y. They a re a llow ed  som e
reh abilit at ion act ivi t ie s , bu t t o class ify  st a te  pr i sons  as
mainst ream is more of a stre t ch  th an  an y cour t sh ould be
willing  to make . Th is  looming question of intent would not be so
if Con gr es s h ad s im ply m ade  it s in ten t  clea r . As a  res u lt  of it s
omission  of clea r  in ten t , cou r t s  m ust  de lve  in to da nger ous
wat er s and in ter pr et  the s t a tu te a ccording t o it s a mbiguous
language.
Whether or not  legislat ive history is th e proper s ta nda rd by
which  to int erpr et  sta tu tory lan guage a nd in ten t wa s debat ed
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79. 473 U.S. 23 4 (1985). 
80. Rober t T. Sm ith , Note , Th e Eleventh Am endm ent’s Clear  S ta tement T est
Af ter  Dellmuth  v.  Muth  and  Pennsylvan ia v. U nion  Gas  Co., 1990 BYU L. R E V. 1157,
1166 (quotin g Atascadero, 47 3 U .S.  at  242 ).
81. S ee gen erally P enn sylvan ia v. U nion  Gas  Co., 491 U.S . 1 (1989), over ru led
on  oth er grou nd s by Se mi no le T ri be o f Fl . v. F lor ida , 51 7 U .S.  44 (1 996 ); Atascadero,
473 U.S. at 234.
82. S ee Yeskey v. Pen nsylva nia  Dep’t of Corr ections, 11 8 F.3d 16 8, 170 (3d Cir.
199 7).
83. One migh t  a rgue  th at  Con gr ess  int en ded  th e Act t o be b roa d so a s t o ma ke
ap plica tion  easy. This is problematic considering the effect s  t h a t  applying th e ADA
would  have on sta te prison budget s, not to ment ion the federa l ism issues involved.
S ee infra  note 122.
in  Ata sca dero S ta te H osp it al  v.  S can lon .79 There , t he  Su preme
Cou r t  deemed r eliance on th e “‘legi sla t ive  h is tory of [a n] Act’”
to int er pr et  a s ta tu te  in a  wa y tha t  poten t ia l ly  usu rps  s t at e
power to be im pr oper  an d voiced grea t h esit an cy to allow
“‘inferences  from genera l s t a tu tory  language’” when  employ ing
the cl ea r  s t a t emen t  t es t .80 Fewer cour ts  ar e r elyin g on
legisla tive  his tor y, especia lly in delica te fed era lism  areas,
because  of th e ir  desire t o require Congres s to evince its inten t
on  the  face  of t he  st a tut e .8 1  By doing so, ther e ar e fewer
ques t ions for  cour t s t o adju dica te wit h  res pe ct  to st a tu tory
in te rpre t a t ion . Broad, overrea ching ter minology an d concepts
shou ld not suffice to convey intent  such that  Congress usurps
powers tra ditionally reserved to the states.
3. Congressional action or inaction/ silence against th e
back dr op of th e Act before its pa ssage
 The Thir d Cir cu i t  a r gu e s t ha t  because th e lan gua ge is “all-
encompa ssin g” an d “broad,” sta te p ris ons a re b rou ght  with in
the sta tu te. 82 This  is pr oblema tic beca us e un der  th is r ea sonin g,
Congr ess can  pa ss a  st at ut e a nd  th en  ap ply it  alon g th e wa y to
whomever  it  wis hes  to in clu de  wit hout  havin g t o declar e its
in ten t .83 Fu r thermore, cou r ts  sh ould n ot be sa ddled  with  th e
res pons ibility  of reading the minds of lawm ak ers  every t ime
someone p rotes t s a  s t a tu te.  In  Y esk ey, th e Third Circuit r ead
Congress’ silence a s a n  im pl ied  app rova l of app lica t ion  of th e
ADA to stat e prisons. The court stat ed:
[T]h e  legisla tive  his tor y doe s n ot in veig h  a g a in s t  th is
conclu sion . W h e n  t h e  A D A w a s  e n a ct e d  in  1 9 9 0,  t h e
Re h ab ilit at ion  Act  ha d  been  l a w  f or  s e v e n t e e n  y ea r s  a n d  a
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84. Yeskey, 118 F.3d at  174 n.7.
85. The Cour t  i n  Amos sta ted, “Congre ssiona l silence in  the ADA’s legisla tive
h i sto ry r e ga r ding the a pplicability of the st atu te to sta te prisons, however, provides
no basis  for inferri ng  con gr es sio na l a pp ro va l of on e Ci rcu it ’s . . . in te rp re ta ti on  of th e
Act.” Amo s v.  Ma ry la nd  Dep’t. of P ub . Sa fet y  a n d C or r ectional Servs., 126 F.3d 589,
602 (4th Cir. 1997). See also Unit ed Sta tes v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 929 (1997)
(rejectin g congre ssion al in action  as t acit a ppr oval); Un ited  Sta tes  v. Dion , 476 U.S.
734, 738 (1986) (In dea ling wit h In dian  righ ts  the Court  stat ed “[w]e have required
tha t  Con gr ess ’ int en tion  to a brogate I nd ia n t re at y r igh ts  be c lea r a nd  pla in .”);
N.L.R.B. v. Plaster er’s Local Union No. 79, 404 U.S. 1 16, 129-30 (1971) (noting t he
danger  of ad opt in g si len ce a s con gr es sio na l in te nt ).
86. 328 U. S. 6 1 (19 46).
87. Id . at 69.  The  a rgumen t  r e ject ed  by  the C ou r t  h e r e i s  simila r  to tha t
a rgumen t  pr offer ed w it h r es pect  to t he  Reh ab ilit at ion  Act.
88. S ee EE OC v . Gi lba rco  In c., 6 15 F .2d  985  (4t h C ir . 19 80).
89. Id .
90. S ee id . at 1013-15.
91. Id . at 1015.
92. 106 F. 3d  559  (4t h C ir . 19 97) (e n b an c).
nu mber  of cas es  h a d h eld  it a pp lica b le  t o p r is on s  a n d
pr i sone r s ,  yet  Con gr e s s  d id  n ot  a m e n d  t h a t  Act  or  a l te r  a n y
langua ge  so  a s  t o  ex t irpa t e  those  in t e rp r e t a t ions . 84
The court  seem s t o look for t he  back  door h er e by su ggest ing
tha t  sin ce Congr ess  did n ot sa y th at  th e ADA does n ot a pply t o
s t a t e prisons, it  should be applicable. However, Congress may
not  have b een  awa re of t he cases in terp re t ing  the
Rehabil it a t ion  Act. Accordin gly, congr es siona l silence can not be
a  subs t itu te  for  actua l  language when  inter pret ing a st at ut e.85
The Supreme Cour t  has  spoken  to th i s i ssue in  Girouard v.
United S tates8 6  where it  stated, “[i]t is at best tr eacherous to
find  in congr ession al s ilence a lone t he a dopt ion of a contr olling
ru le of law.”87 Even  J ud ge Mu rn agh an , t he d issen tin g judge in
Am os, agrees that  silence must  not be constr u ed  as
acquiescence.8 8  I n  EEOC v.  Gi lbar co, In c.,89 he  had  d iffi cu l ty
with  the suggest ion th at  congres siona l silen ce or ina ction in
reenact ing a  st a tu te con st it u tes  en dor se men t  of pr ior
int erp ret at ion of t he  st a tu t e .90 J udge Mu rn agha n r easoned  tha t
Congress cannot  poss ib ly  know of t he  va r ious  in t e rpret a t ions
circu l a t in g about each statut e. In essence, he stat ed, “they do
not  in fa ct a ppr ove wha t t he y kn ow not hin g abou t.”91
Amos em ployed  the F our th  Cir cu it ’s a na lys is  from Virginia
Depa rt m ent of  Ed u ca ti on  v . R i ley92 wher e it ap plied th e clear
s ta tement  ru le and  s ta ted  tha t  “not  ‘a  sin gle word  from the
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93. Amos  v. M ar yla nd  Dep’t of P ub . Sa fet y  a n d Correctional Ser vs., 126 F.3d
589, 603 (4th  Cir. 1997) (quot ing R iley , 10 6 F .3d  at  567 ).
94. 501 U. S. 4 52 (1 991 ).
95. R iley , 106 F.3d  at  567-68 (citing Gregory, 50 1 U .S.  at  460 -70).
st a tu t e or from t he legis lat ive his tor y of [th e In dividu als  wit h
Disabilities  Educa t ion  Act  (IDEA)] evidence[s] that  Congress
even consider ed’ requ ir ing st at es t o cont inu e pr oviding
educa t iona l services to disabled children  after  th eir expuls ion
for  mis condu ct u nr elat ed t o th eir d isa bilities .”93 The  court  is
esse nt ially sa ying t ha t s ilence is  sile nce, a nd t he s t a tu te ca n
only be applied where Congress has spoken  to the  is sue.  The
cour t  in Riley quot ed t he S up rem e Cour t’s r eas oning in  Gregory
v. Ashcroft94 and sta ted:
[T]h e  Age  Di scr imina t ion  in  Em ploymen t  Ac t , wh ich  cove red
employees o f ‘a  S t a t e  or  polit ical  su bd ivis ion  of a St at e,’ . . . did
n ot  a p p l y  t o s t a t e  j u d g es  b e ca u s e  t h e  p r o v is i on  d i d  n ot
un am biguous ly r evea l  t ha t  Congres s  in t en ded  s u ch  a  r e s u l t .  I n
r e a ch in g th i s  conclus ion ,  t he  Cour t  r easoned  tha t  a  c l ea r
s t a te m e n t is r equ ire d n ot sim ply in  det er m ini n g  w h e t h e r  a
s t a t u t e  app l i e s  t o  the  S ta t e s , bu t  a l so in  de t e rm in ing  whe th e r
t h e  s t a t u t e  a p p l i e s  in  t h e  p a r t i cu l a r  m a n n e r  c l a im e d . 95
As th is discussion has sh own, the ADA lacks any in dicia  of
congr es siona l in ten t  st rong en ough  to su pp or t  app lica t ion  of
this stat ute to state prisons.
4. Fed era li sm  can on
 While  t h e  F ourt h Circuit am ply provides l ogica l cou n t er
a rgumen t s re gar din g th e pla in la ngu age , legisla tive  his tor y,
and congres siona l act ion or in act ion/silen ce aga ins t t he
backdrop of th e Act  before its  pass age, th e cour t’s st rongest
a rgument  and  the u ltim at e solu tion  to the  broad  st a tu tory
language is t he  clear  st at em en t d octrin e. By em ploying t h is
doctr ine, the cou r t  es se n t ia lly  byp ass es  a  hyper -t ech nica l
reading of th e Act for a sim ple one w hich  ult ima tely r evea ls
tha t  there is no clear stat ement of intent to apply t he AD A to
sta te pr isons on th e face of the st at ut e.
a. Clear s ta tement doct rine. In des cribing the clear
s t a t em ent  doct r in e, t he S upr em e Cour t  has h eld  tha t  for
Congress to usur p st at e power , su ch a s would  occur  her e, it
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96. S ee Gregory,  501 U.S. at 452; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234 (1985); Penn hu rst  Sta te Sch . & Hosp. v. H ald e r m a n , 465 U.S. 89 (1984); United
Stat es v. B as s, 4 04 U .S.  336  (197 1).
97. 404 U. S. 3 36 (1 971 ).
98. Id . at 349.
99. Crawford v. In dia na  Dep ’t of Cor re ction s, 115 F .3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing Br ya nt  v. M ad iga n,  84 F .3d  246 , 24 9 (7t h C ir . 19 96)).
100. Crawford, 115 F.3d at  486.
must  ma ke it s in te nt  “un mis ta ka bly clear .”96 In  United States v.
Bass, 97 t he  Cour t  exp la in ed  the ra t iona le for  such  a  ru le as
follows: “In  t r adi t ion a lly  se nsi t ive  a rea s,  su ch  as legi sla t ion
affect ing th e feder al ba l ance, the r equirem ent  of clear
s ta tement  assu re s t ha t t he  legisla tu re  ha s in  fact fa ced, a nd
int end ed t o brin g int o issu e, th e crit ical ma tt ers  involved in  th e
jud icia l decision .”98 The re is  no eviden ce in t he la nguage or
legisla tive  history of the ADA that  Congress intended  t o ap ply
i t  to s t a te p r isons .
Even  circuits dis a gr eein g with  Amos concede  tha t  the
language is to some extent  un clear in t he pr ison cont ext. The
cour t  in Crawford  stat ed th at  “[i]ncar cera tion  its elf is h ar dly a
‘p rogram’ or  ‘act ivi ty’ t o wh ich  a  d isabled  per son  might  wish
access .”99 The  court  conceded t ha t “th e spe cial conditions  of the
prison  sett ing license a  degr ee  of discr im in a t ion  tha t  wou ld  not
be tolerated in a  free en vir onmen t  [and] . .  . a pp lica t ion  [of th e
ADA] to pr isone rs  migh t p rodu ce some a nom alie s.”10 0  The
Crawford cour t  a rgued tha t  Congress could n ot ha ve been more
clear in th e sta tu te, hen ce ther e is no need t o use th e clear
s ta tement  ru le. One of Crawford’s r ebu t ta l s to the  clea r
s ta tement  doctr ine r esults  from the  fact  tha t  in  I ll inoi s,  the
ADA ap plies t o st a te p r ison  em ployee s,  hen ce, t he Cour t
reasons that  it  should natura lly apply to s t a te p r isoners as
well. This is a tt en ua te d r ea sonin g conside rin g th at  th e
employees ar e free , law -abiding citizens while prisoners ar e
convict ed  offen de rs b ein g punished  for  their  act ion s.
b. Effect and  im port of the clear statement rule . The clea r
s ta teme nt  ru le m anda tes  more p recis e s t a tem en ts fr om
Con gr ess in the  actua l s t a tu tory  t ext  i ncluding s t a t emen t s
regard ing scope, pr ocedur al gu idelin es, and enforcement rules.
This  ru le  a ids  cour t s  in  s t a tu tor y  int erp ret at ion in t ha t it
“‘fore close [s] in qu ir y in to ex t ri nsic guid es,’” such a s “str uctu re,
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101. John Copela nd N agle, Waiving Sovereign Imm unity in  an Age of Clear
S ta tem ent  Ru les, 1995 WI S . L. RE V. 771, 772 (qu otin g EE OC v. Ara bian  Am. Oil Co.,
499 U. S. 2 44,  263  (199 1) (Ma rs ha ll, J ., d iss en ti ng )).
102. Id . at  773 (q uot ing  Ast oria  Fe d. S av.  & Loa n Ass’n , v. Solimino, 501 U.S.
104, 108 (1 991)); see also Cipollone v. L iggett  Grou p, In c., 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992)
(Scalia,  J. ,  concurring in part an d dissenting in part) (“[O]ur jurispr u d e n ce abounds
wit h  rules of ‘plain sta temen t,’ ‘clear stat ement ,’ and ‘narrow construction’ desi gn ed
var iously to ensure that ,  absent unam biguous evidence of Congress’s in t en t ,
ext r aord ina ry constit ut ional power s ar e not  invoked, o r  impor tan t  cons t i tu t iona l
p r ot ection s elimin at ed, or s eem ingly in equ ita ble doctr ines  app lied. (see, e.g., Will v.
Mich igan Dep’t of S ta te  Po lice , 49 1 U .S.  58,  65 (1 989 ).” (cit at ion  om it te d)).
103. S ee generally David  L. Sh apir o, Cont inu it y  and  Ch ange in Stat utory
In terp reta tion , 67 N.Y.U. L . RE V. 921 , 921 -22 (19 92) (“[J]u st ices  of th e Su pr em e Cou rt
a re at te mp tin g wit h m iss iona ry  zea l to n ar row  th e focus  of cons ide ra tion  to t h e
s t a tu tory text  an d its  ‘plain  mea nin g.’”). 
pur pose, or  h is tory  of a  s t a tu t e. ”101 In  add it ion , courts consider
these ru les  im pe ra t ive  to “‘th e pr otect ion of weigh t y  and
cons tan t va lu es , be  they con st it ut iona l, or oth er wise.’”102 The
requ i rement of a  cl ea r  s t a t emen t  of i nt en t  in  s t a tu t es is gain ing
popu la r ity among ma ny ju dges  th rou ghou t t he  count ry. 103 More
and more judges a re concerned with  th eir roles as  inter pret ers
of th e law . Hen ce, th ey ar e re luct an t t o imput e in ten t  where
none is clearly stated.
Cr it ics  of the clear st a t e m en t  ru le migh t a rgu e th at  it is
overly conserva t ive to s t r ict ly app ly  sta tu tes accord ing  to the
pla in  l anguage. They might  also say th at  th e clear st at emen t
ru le is bur densom e an d tim e consu ming on t he judicial system .
However , in  many ways it  seems that  th is  ru le  makes i t easier
for  cour t s  t o det e rmine  the scope of a  s t a tut e  by r ely in g on  the
actua l lan gua ge wit hou t b ein g r e quir ed t o res ea rch  legisla tive
h i story and a dm in is t ra t ive  agen cy in ter pr et a t ion s.  In  add it ion ,
it  is important  to clarify and carry out Congress’ i n t en t ,
espe cially when  the pr oposed regulation usur ps state powers,
such as the ADA does with stat e prisons.
Cour t s a re  ra is ing  the ba r  of st a tu tory  cons t ruct ion  and
req uir ing Con gr es s t o be  more spe cific so tha t  some  st a tu tory
int erp ret at ion questions never make it to court  in the first
place. With em ployment  of th e clear st at emen t  rule, the days of
Congress’ passing the buck to court s to resolve issues more
eas ily dealt  with a t t he congressional level seem to be over.  The
Supreme Cou r t  has deemed t he clear s ta tem ent  doctr ine to be a
logica l way of dea lin g wi th  the on goin g proble m of st a tu tory
int erp ret at ion in  ligh t  of it s d ecis ion  in  Atascadero. As a r esu lt,
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104. S ee Ata sca de ro  St at e H osp . v. S can lon , 47 3 U .S.  234 , 24 2 (19 85).
105. S ee Procunier v. Mar tinez,  416  U .S. 396 (1974), overr ul ed on  oth er grou nd s
by Th ornb ur gh  v. Ab bot t,  490  U. S. 4 01 (1 989 ); see also Pr eiser  v. R od r ig u ez, 411 U.S.
475, 491 -92 (1 973 ).
106. Procu ni er, 416  U.S . a t 4 12.  Th e cou r t  w en t  on  to i de nt ify s om e of t he
governmenta l interest s tha t ar e at st ake; such as “the pr eservation of interna l order
and discipline, t he m ain ten an ce of institu tiona l secur ity a gain st  esca pe or
in  order  for Congre ss t o infrin ge on stat e rights, they must
m ake their  in ten t ion  to do s o “un mis takably  clea r” on t he fa ce
of th e sta tu te. 104 The ADA fails to do this; hen ce, sta tes  sh ould
ret ain  exclusive cont rol.
5. A  draw?
 The issue of sta t u t or y  in t e r pr e t a t ion  is  de fin it ely  not  cut
and dry on either side. It  is at least argua ble tha t court s could
an d h ave r ead  th e pla in  l anguage  of t he  st a tu t e  t o include state
prisons. In  ad dit ion , many cou r t s u se  leg is la t ive  h is tory a nd/or
congr es siona l s ile nce/in act ion  to int er pr et  st at ut es eve n t hou gh
the Supreme Court has voiced reservations aga i nst doing so.
However , t he  cl ea r  s t a t emen t  doct r in e is  an  es tabli sh ed  canon
of stat utory interpreta tion  which  pr ovides t he F our th  Circu it
with  its  st ronges t  a rgu men t  aga in st  app lica t ion  in the  st a tu tory
int erp ret at ion context . This  Note  concedes t ha t wit h respect  to
the  st a tu tory int er pr et at ion a spe ct of th is iss ue , th e a rgumen t s
p roffe red by both  sides ar guably am ount  to a dr aw. However,
since application of the ADA to state prisons would usurp a
pow er  t r adi t ion a lly  res er ved  to the s t a t es , t he  Four th Circu it is
clear ly correct in asserting that  above and beyond the issu e of
s t a tu tory int e rpre t a tion , prin ciples of federa lism ma nda te a
clearer  expression of intent  if not complete a brogation of power
to the states to man age their prisons.
B. Federalism
1. S ta te p ri son  m an agem ent i s a  core s ta te f uncti on
 It  is  fir mly e st abli sh ed  tha t  the op er a t ion  of s t a te p r isons is
a  core  st a te  funct ion .105 In  Procunier  th e cour t st at ed, “One of
the pr i m ar y funct ions  of government  is  the p rese rva t ion  of
societa l order th rough  enforcement  of the  cr imina l  law, and the
main tenance of pena l  ins t itu t ions  is  an  essen t ia l pa r t  of tha t
task .”106 P r i sons  a re a  necessary evil in a  society wh ere  an  in
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una uth orized en t ry,  and t he r eh abi li t a t ion  of t he p r is on er s.” Id . (foot no te  om it te d).
107. S ee generally Georgia Peniten tiary Co. v. Nelms, 65 Ga. 499 (1880); Jones
Holl ow Ware Co. v. Crane, 134 Md. 103 (1919); Shena ndoah Lime Co. v. Gov er nor
of Va. , 11 5 Va . 86 5 (19 14).
108. 990 F.2d 131, 133 (4th Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit held that state
p r isone r s enrolled in an “employment skills development progra m” while incarcera ted
did not qu ali fy for m in im um  wa ge u nd er  th e F air  La bor  St an da rd s Act . Th e cou rt
stated:  “Even w it h  a  b r oa d re ad ing  of th is t er m [‘emp loyee ’], we s ee n o ind icat ion t ha t
Congress pr ovide d F LSA cove ra ge for  inma tes  enga ged in  pris on la bor pr ogra ms .” Id .
The cou rt  went  on  to p ro cla im : “If t h e FL SA’s cover age  is t o ext en d wit hin  pr ison
walls, Congr es s must  say s o,  not  the c ou r t s.” Id . at 136.
109. S ee id . at 136.
110. 931 F. 2d  132 0 (9t h C ir . 19 91).
111. Id . at 1325. Oth er circuits t hat  have be e n  un wil lin g t o ap ply  th e F LS A to
s t a t e prison  inm at es inclu de th e Seven th  Circuit  in Vansk ike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806
(7th  C ir . 1992), and  th e Fir st Cir cuit in  Miller v. Dukak is, 96 1 F .2d  7 (1s t C ir . 19 92).
The rea sons for n ot ap plying t he F LSA to st at e pris oner s var y among th e ci r cu i t s bu t
include the lack of intent expressed by Congress and policy issues con n ected  wi th
such  a st at ut e. See generally Harker, 990  F.2 d a t 1 31; Gilbreath , 931 F.2d at 1325.
crea sin g number of individua l s a re  finding the ir  way in to such
facilities for violating t he la w . S t a te prisons a re est ablished  by
and for  the  st a tes  in  the exer t ion  of the ir  cons t itu t iona l ly
reser ved powers, and in furtheran ce of their duty to pun i sh
those who show no regard for the la w.107 Amos r e lied on  the
Four th Circu it’s conclusion  in Harker v. State Use In dust ries108
tha t  the op er a t ion  of st a te p r isons i s a  core s t a te fu nct ion .109
Relying  on t he  sa me  re as onin g, th e Nint h Circuit  denied
ap plicat ion of t he  Fa i r La b or  S tanda rds Act  (FLSA) to s t a t e
p r isone r s in Gilbreath v. Cut ter  B iolog ica l  Inc.110 where  the
court  stat ed:
I t  i s  equa l ly  p l aus ib l e , i ndeed  m ore  so , t ha t  i n  v i ew of th e
m a n i fe s t pu rp ose  of Con gr es s in  en act in g t h e F LS A, it d id n ot
c ross a n y  m e m be r ’s  m in d — ev en  for  a  m o m en t — t h a t felon s
ser vin g h a r d  t im e  in  p r is on  a n d  w ork ing  in t he  pr ocess w ould
be  cover ed b y th is econ om ic pr otect ion . I  r e j ec t  a s  a lmos t
w h im sica l t h e n oti on  th a t C on gr es s cou ld h a ve i n te n de d s u ch
a  ra dica l re su lt a s br ing ing  p r is on e r s w it h in  t h e F L S A w it h ou t
exp re ssly  so st at ing . Th er e a re  obviou s policy con side ra tion s in
s u ch  a  r e su l t t h a t  sh ou ld b e op en ly a dd re ss ed  by C on gr es s, n ot
the  cour t s . 111
While  the FLSA is  di ffer en t  in  many a sp ect s fr om the ADA, the
reason ing beh ind  non ap plica t ion to st at e pr isons  is qu ite
sim ilar  because both  concern  th e federa l  governmen t ’s  a t t empt
to regula te a  tr adit ional sta te power. Ma na geme n t of s t a t e
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112. 34 F. 3d  266  (4t h C ir . 19 94).
113. Id . at 268.
114. 844 F. 2d  828  (D.C . Ci r.  198 8).
115. Id . at 841.
116. 416 U.S. 39 6 (1974), over r u led on  oth er grou nd s by Th orn bu rg h v . Abbot t,
490 U.S. 40 1 (1989). 
117. Id . at 404-05.
pr isons is a power traditionally left to the stat es because of th e
policy conce rns inhe ren t  in  r egu lat ing  a core  funct ion  a nd
because t hey ar e state prisons.
Many cir cu it s h ave fou nd tha t  s t a te p r isons  a re the
res pons ibility  of the st ates a lone. In Taylor v. Freem an ,112 t he
Four th C ircu i t concluded tha t  “absen t  t he  mos t  ex t raord ina ry
cir cu m stan ces, feder al cour ts  ar e not  to im mer se t hem selves  in
the managemen t  of s t a t e p r isons  or  subs t i tu te the ir  judgment
for  th at  of the t ra ined  pen ological au th orit ies cha rged  with  t he
ad min ist ra tion  of such fa cilities .”1 1 3  The Dist rict  of Colum bia
Circu it  similar ly stat ed in  Inm ates of Occoquan v. B arry114 t ha t
“in  ca r rying ou t  t heir r eme dia l ta sk , cour ts  ar e not  to be in  th e
business of runn in g p r isons. Th e case s m ak e it p lain  th at
ques t ions of prison administ r a t ion  a re  to be l eft  to the
discr et ion of pris on a dm inis tr at ors.”115 It  is evident  from circu it
preceden t tha t  st a te p r ison  managem en t  is  res er ved  for  t he
stat es.
This  logic is simila rly u ph eld in  a  long l ine  of Supreme
Cou r t  de cis ion s.  Th e Cour t  addressed  concerns of comi ty and
com pe tence in the  con text  of s t a t e p r ison  managemen t  in
Procunier  v.  Mar ti nez116 where the Court stat ed:
Tra di t iona l ly , fe d er a l cou r t s  h a ve  a d o p ted  a  b road  h and s -of f
a t t i t u d e  toward  p rob lems  of p ris on a dm inis tr at ion . . . . [T]his
a t t i t u d e  sp rin gs fr om  com ple m en ta ry  pe rce pt ion s a bou t t h e
n a t u r e  of th e p r oble m s a n d t h e e ffica cy of jud icia l
in te rv en tion  . . . . Suffice it  to s ay  th at  th e p rob lem s of p ris on s
in  Am eri ca  a re  com ple x a n d in tr act ab le, a n d, m ore  to t h e
p o in t , th ey a re  not  re ad ily su scep tible  of res olut ion  by
dec ree .  . .  . Moreove r ,  wher e  s t a t e p e n a l i n st it u t io n s a r e
in v ol ve d , fe d er a l  co u r ts  h a v e a  fu r t h e r  r ea s on  fo r d e fe r en c e  t o
the  a ppropr i a t e  p r i son  au t ho r i t i e s .117
This  s t a tement affirms t he im por tance of le avin g s ta te p r ison
management  to the s t a tes  because  of pol icy con side ra t ion s a nd
the delega t ion  of du ty to those who posses s  t he  r equ is it e
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118. 411 U. S. 4 75 (1 973 ).
119. Id . at 491-92.
120. S ee id ; see al so Pr ocun ier , 416 U.S . at 396 ; Hark er v. Sta te Use  Indu s., 990
F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1993); Inmates o f Occoquan  v. Bar ry, 844 F .2d 828 (D.C. Cir.
198 8).
121. These ele cte d officials often run  fo r  of fi ce  on  p la t fo rms cen te red a round
crime  an d issu es dea ling wit h pr isons dir ectly.
122. One California  Depa rt men t of Corre ctions sp okesper son est ima t e d  t h e cost
of re-fitt ing a nd b uildin g new  str uctu res  to be over  50 million  dollar s. S ee Obey Law,
and Com m on S ens e: Not  Ev ery P ris on C an  Meet  th e N eeds  of E ver y Disab led  Con vict ,
L.A.  TI M E S, Sept . 24, 1996, at  B6. This w ould inclu de ad ding  th ings  such as  str obe
l igh t ala rm s for  dea f inm at es,  sign s a nd  books  for in ma te s wh o ar e visua lly impaired,
in t erp re t er s for t he  dea f, an d sp ecia l ed uca tion  pr ogr am s for  i n m a t es  with  l ea rn ing
knowled ge necess a ry t o effect ive ly m anage p r isons in
accorda nce with t he goals of each st at e.
The decision in  Procun ier came on  the h eels  of ye t  a nother
Supreme Cou r t  de cis ion  tha t  sp oke t o this  is sue.  In  Preiser v.
R odrigu ez118 th e Court  sta ted: “It is difficult t o imagine an
act ivity  in  which  a  S ta te has  a  s t ronger  in teres t , or  one  tha t is
more intr icately bound up  with s ta te law s, r egu lat ions, a nd
procedures, than  the admin i st ra t ion  of its  pr isons .”119 Thus,  the
highest cour t  of the  land  and  numer ous ci rcu i t s r ecognize the
imp er at ive role of s t a te s  i n  th e pr ison cont ext , an d h ave
cont inua lly upheld stat e power when  challenged by federal
in t rusion .120
There are nu merous factors th a t  affirm th e import an ce of
sta tes  in t he oper at ion of sta te corr ectiona l  faci li t ie s.  St a t e
taxpayers  pay for  the  opera t ion  of its pr isons. Registered voter s
of a  s t a t e e lect  sta te officia ls  wh o over se e t he m anagem en t  of
s t a t e facilities such as prisons.121 Inasmuch  as  each  s ta te has
differen t  procedures, bud gets , goals, a nd  pr oblems  rega rd ing
prison  facilitie s, it is difficult t o imagine delegat ing th is power
t o th e federal governm ent  for a ll of the fifty stat es. As a resu lt ,
it  is  import an t t o reserve t his power for th e sta tes s o they can
effect ive ly ca r ry ou t  the jobs t hey h ave b een  ele cted  to do.
2. Eff ects  of app ly in g the AD A to s ta te p ri son s
 T h er e ar e several possible negat ive consequen ces t h a t
would  result from applying the ADA to state prisons,  not  the
lea st  of wh ich  is  t he financia l bu rden  that  w il l con fron t  s t a t es
forced to r e-fit  curr ent str uctures and build new facilities to
comply with  the  st andard s  se t  fort h in t he ADA.122 The cos t  t o
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disabilities. See id ; see also Dan  Mora in, S ta te’s Pri son s T old  to F ollow  Dis abi lit ies
Act, L.A. TI M E S,  Sep t . 21, 1996, a t A1; Dan  Mora in, Ju dge Says Calif. Prisons Must
Comply  w ith Disabilities Law: Deaf Inmates Could Get Interpreters, Others Special
Ed uca tion , SEATTLE  TI M E S, Sept. 21, 1996, at A2.
123. S ee Yeskey v. Penns ylvania Dep’t of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 174  (3d  Ci r .
199 7).
124. S ee Crawford v. Ind ian a Dep ’t of Corre ctions, 115 F .3d 481, 487 (7th  Cir.
1997) (noting that  “security concerns . . . ar e high ly releva nt  to det erm inin g th e
feas ib il it y of the a ccommodat ions that  disabled persons nee d in order to have access
to desir ed pr ogram s an d ser vices,” but not  definin g th e mea nin g of “rea sona ble
accommoda t ion” an d “u nd ue  bu rd en ” in t he  st at e p ri son  con te xt ).
125. Crawford, 115 F.3d at  486; see a lso Aswegan v. Bruh l, 113 F.3d 109 (8th
Cir . 1997) (overr uling a sta te district court decision that  allowed an elderly prisoner
to have cable television in his cell under  the ADA because h e was too feeble to wa lk
fift y feet  to t he  act ivit y r oom i n  th e pr ison ). Th is is  only  one  exa mp le of t he  friv olous
law suits that  are possible if the ADA is applied to state prisons.
126. S ee Yeskey, 11 8 F .3d  at  174 -75.  Th e cou rt  st at ed : “[O]ur  hold ing  does  not
dispose of th e con tr over sia l an d di fficult  qu est ion [of ] wh et he r p ri nci ple s of de fer en ce
to th e de cision s of pr ison  officials  in t he  cont ext  of cons t i t u t iona l l aw app ly  to
s t a tu tory rig ht s. We  ar e n ot s ur e of t he  an swe r a nd  ne ed n ot a d d r es s  t h a t  qu est ion
now.” Id . (cit at ion s om it te d).
br i n g exi st in g s t a t e fa cili t ies  in t o complian ce would
un doubt edly be  sign ifica n t . Ci rcu i t s tha t  have  held tha t  the
ADA applies t o stat e prisons concede tha t  some ser ious  secu r ity
concern s exist , su ch a s cell const ru ction, in ma te p air ings, and
work releas e.123 While recognizing that  application of th e ADA
to st a te p r isons w ill  have fa r -rea chin g r ep er cuss ion s, these
circuit s do not  ou t line ways to deal with such problems.124 For
examp le, the Crawford cour t  conceded tha t :
P r i so n er s  ar e n ot a  fav ore d g rou p in  societ y; th e p rop en sit y of
som e o f t h e m  t o s u e  a t  t h e  d r op  o f a  h a t  i s  we ll kn own ; pr ison
sys t ems  a re  s t r a pped  for  fu n d s ; t h e  pr a ct ica l effect of gr an tin g
d i sab led p r i sone r s  .  .  . r ight s  of  access  th at  migh t  re qu ire  costly
m odifica tion s  of pr ison  facilit ies  m igh t b e t h e cu rt ai lm en t of
e d u ca t ion a l , r ec rea t iona l ,  and  r eh a bilit at ive p rog ra m s for
pr ison er s, in  wh ich  ev en t e ve r yon e m igh t b e w or se  off.125
In ter est ingly enough, even  aft er  all of th ese conces sions , th e
cour t  decided to a pply t he Act t o sta te p ris ons. It  is evident t ha t
the re a re m any proble ms con nect ed  wit h  th is  de cis ion ,
p rob lems th at  ha ve no solu tion s beca us e t hose  court s willin g to
ap ply th e st at ut e ar e un willing  to define  how to ca r ry  ou t  the
regu lat ions  in  the  pr i son  con text .126
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127. S ee Yeskey, 118  F.3 d 16 8, 17 0-71; see also Chev ron  U.S.A., Inc. v .  Natura l
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (holdin g  t h at
adm inist ra tive  agen cies shou ld be accorde d th e grea test  possible weig h t  and  defe re nce
in  in te rp re ti ng  st at ut es ).
128. S ee Gre gory v. Ash croft, 501 U .S. 452, 493  (1991) (Blackm un , J .,
dissen tin g) (argu ing u nsu ccessfully th at  Chevron  deference, not the clear sta temen t
rule,  is a ppr opr iat e); supra  Par t III.B.1.
129. S ee supra  Par t II.B.2.
130. S ee Ch evron , 467 U.S. at 837.
131. S ee i d . S ee generally Burea u of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firear ms v. Federa l
La bor  Relations Aut h., 464 U.S. 89 (1983); Long v. Dick, 347 P.2d 581  (Ari z. 1 959 );
Hope Evangelical Luther an Ch urch v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue & F i n . 463 N.W.2d 76
(Iowa 1990), cert . d eni ed , 49 9 U .S.  961  (199 0).
132. Ch evron , 467 U.S . at  842. 
133. S ee supra  Part  IV.A. Some courts sa y  t h at Congr ess h as s poken  clearly
enou gh  to include sta t e pr ison s. As  dis cus sed  ea rl ier , th e is su e of st at ut ory
int er pr et at ion  i s l a rge ly  a  wash .
3. DOJ  interpretation
 Circu its  holding tha t  the ADA app lie s t o st a te p r isons re ly,
in  pa rt , on th e DOJ ’s a dm inis tr at ive in ter pret a t ion  of the
st a tu t e to jus t ify  thei r  pos it ion .127 Wh ile  de fer r in g t o t he
ad min ist ra tive  agency’s  in te rpre ta t ion  is usu ally war ra nt ed
and even e ncour aged , in a  sit ua tion  w h er e th e st at ut e could
ups et  th e balan ce of p ow er  between  sta tes a nd t he federa l
govern men t,  the  Supr e me  Cour t  held tha t  it  i s impor t an t  t o
em ploy the clear st atement  test as described ear lier.128 In  the
sit ua tion  at  bar , th e DOJ  would  ap ply t h e ADA to s t a t e
p r isons.1 29 However, this is not conclusive because th ere is a
s e r iou s quest ion of whet her  or not it is even p roper t o defer  t o
the DOJ  in t his  ar ea . His tor ically, cour ts  ha ve given  grea t
weigh t  to a dm inis tr at ive age n cy interpreta tions of statutes. 130
However , t he re i s ca se l aw  tha t s ugges ts  th at  ad min ist ra tive
a g ency int erp ret at ion is n ot bin din g on a cour t if it is  ar bitr a ry
or otherwise unsupported.131
In  Chevron v. Na tural R esources Defense Council, t he Cour t
suggest ed th at  when a  cour t r eviews an  ad min ist ra tive  agen cy’s
int erp ret at ion of a st at ut e, it is confronted with t wo questions.
The first qu estion is “wheth er Congress  ha s directly spoken  to
the pr ecise qu est ion a t is su e.”132 If Congr es s h as,  the cou r t ’s
ana lysis is  over ; the cou r t  must  give  effect  to congr es siona l
in ten t . Congress has not even hinted at app lying t he ADA to
s t a t e pr isons  in t he  st at ut ory t ext .133 Therefore, th i s p rong  of
the an alys is is b ypa sse d in  favor of th e second  que st ion. If
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134. Ch evron , 467 U.S. at 843.
135. Id . at 844.
136. Amos  v. Ma ry la nd  Dep ’t of P ub . Sa fet y & Cor re ct ional Ser vs., 126 F.3d 589,
606 (4t h C ir . 19 97) (q uo ti ng  Com mo nw ea lt h o f Va.  Dep’t of E duc. v. Riley, 106 F.3d
559, 567  (4t h C ir . 19 96)).
137. S ee infra  Par t IV.B.4.
Congress ha s not a ddr essed t he pr ecise is su e, “t he ques t ion  for
the cour t  is w h et h er  the a gen cy’s a nsw er  is  ba se d on  a
per mis sible  cons t ruct ion  of t he  st a tute .”134 The  agen cy’s
int erp ret at ion an d r egu lat ions w ill be “given cont rollin g weigh t
unless th ey ar e a rb itr ar y, capr icious, or m an ifest ly contr ar y to
the st at ut e.”135 While the D OJ’s  in t e rpre t a t ion  is  not  facially
“a rb it r a ry,  cap r icious , or  man ife st ly con t r a ry to the  st a tu te ,” as
a  res u lt  of th e deli ca te federa lism issu es involved here,
defe rence to adm inistr at ive a g ency  in te rpre ta t ion  i s not
app ropria te.
In  Am os, the prisoners and t h e  J u stice Depar tm ent  ar gued
tha t  if ther e  is  a n am biguity in a s ta tu te, th e cour t m ust  defer
to the adm inistrative agency’s interpreta tion, in this case the
DOJ . In r esponse, th e Amos cour t  s t a ted  tha t  the p r isoners and
DOJ  “ma ke th is cont ention ‘as if we were  in t e rpre t ing a  s t a tu t e
which  has  no im pl ica t ion s for  the ba lance  of power  between  the
Federa l Governm e n t an d t he  St at es.’”136 However, because t he
possible  consequences  of app ly ing  the s t a tu te to s t a te p r isons
a re fa r -r each ing a nd  poten tia lly dam agin g to th e feder al a nd
s t a t e balan ce of power, th e Am os cour t  de clin ed  to de fer  to the
DOJ ’s int e rpre ta t ion  and fol lowe d t he S upr em e Cour t ’s
reason ing in  Gregory.137
It  is  plausible  to give  the DOJ  som e limit ed  de fer en ce in
in terpre t ing an d a pplyin g  t h e ADA. However, complet e
defe rence is not app ropriat e he re b ecau se t o do so would, in
essence, allow a n a dm inis tr at ive age ncy (composed of
nonelected officials) to upset  th e balan ce of power  between  sta te
a n d federal government s.  Inasmuch as sta te prison
m a n a g em e n t is a core sta te fun ction, a llowing a n
ad min ist ra tive  agen cy to usu rp  th is power  by int erp ret ing
congr es siona l silen ce is at  th e very lea st  ina ppr opria te  if not
uncons t itu t iona l .
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138. Gar cia v. San Antonio Metro. Tran sit Aut h., 469 U .S. 528, 549 (1985) (citing
2 ANNALS  O F  CO N G. 189 7 (17 91)).
139. S ee TH E  F E D E R A L I S T NO . 45, a t 3 13 (J am es M ad ison ) (J.  E. C ooke  ed.,
196 1).  J ames  Mad ison  s t a t ed in  TH E  F E D E R A L I S T NO .  45  tha t :
The powers delegated by the pr oposed Constitu tion to the F ederal
Governmen t , are few and defined. Those which are to rema in in the St a t e
Governmen t s a r e  numerous and  inde fin it e .  .  .  . Th e  powers r e served  to the
severa l S t a t e s w il l ext end  to all  the objects, which, in the ordinary course
of a ff ai r s,  conce rn  the l ives, liberties and properties of the people; and th e
in te rna l order, improvement , and prosperit y of the St ate.
Id . Ja mes  Madis on specifically sta tes t ha t power  which concer ns “int ern al orde r” will
be left to the stat es, suggesting tha t sta te prison ma nageme nt should be le ft t o th e
states.
140. 426 U.S. 83 3 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528. The Cour t h eld
th a t  th e Ten th  Amen dme nt  preve nt ed Congr ess from  applyin g federa l min imu m wa ge
and overtime stat utes applicable to state employees.
141. National Lea gu e of Ci ties , 426 U.S. at 855.
4. If  Con gres s clear ly  m an ifest s i ts  in ten t,  does i t h av e th e
pow er to ap pl y the AD A to s ta te p ri son s? The stat us of
federalism today
 The Fram ers of the Const itut ion did not int end  for  the
federal  govern men t  to usu rp s t a te p owers.  J ames  Ma dison
sta ted  tha t  “[i ]n te r fe rence  wi th  the power  of the  Sta tes  was  no
cons t itu t iona l criterion of the power of Congres s. If the power
was not  given, Congr ess could  n ot  exercise it; if given, they
migh t  exercise  it, a lth ough it  sh ould in ter fere wit h t he la ws, or
even the Constitut ion of the Sta tes.”138 The Framers d id  not
delineat e any sp ecific st a t e powers in  the Con st it u t ion  it se lf,
bu t left all powers not given t o the federa l govern m e n t  t o t he
stat es.139 The extent of federal power has been t he t opic of
deba te th roughout  much  of our  h i story . While the re a re
differin g opinions  on  where  to d raw the  line between  sta te  and
federal  pow er , for  pu rpos es  of th is quest ion, all sides agree  tha t
management of st a te p ris ons is  a core s ta te fu nct ion. Ha ving
sa id th i s,  jus t  how far can Congress go in regulating state
prisons?
In  1976, the Su prem e Cour t  decided in  Nat iona l League of
Cities v. Usery140 th at  “Congr ess m ay n ot exer cise [its
Commer ce Clause] power  so as to force directly upon t he St at es
its  choices as to how essen t i a l decis ion s r ega rding t he con du ct
of in tegra l governm en ta l fun ctions  ar e t o be ma de.”141 The
Cou r t  ba se d i t s d ecis ion  on the fa ct  tha t  t he  federa l min imum
wage and overt ime  ru les h an dicap ped  th e st at es’ abil ity t o
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ L A N _F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
875] STATE PRISONS AND THE  ADA 903
142. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). This  case  p resen ts  essen t ia l ly  the  same i ssue  as
National Lea gu e of Ci ties , bu t t he  cour t fou nd  t h a t  t h e f ede ra l min imum wage  and
overt ime  stat utes wer e applicable to a mass tr ansit s ystem.
143. Id . at 552.
144. S ee id . at  557 -79 (P owe ll, J ., d iss en ti ng ).
145. Id . at  580  (Reh nq ui st , J ., d iss en ti ng ).
146. 501 U. S. 4 52 (1 991 ).
147. Id . at 464.
funct ion  efficiently, and divest ed t he  st at es of cert ain  int egr al
powers. E ight  year s la ter , in Garcia v. Sa n An tonio
Metropolitan Transit Auth ority,142 th e Supr eme Cour t overru led
Na tional League of Cities.  In Garcia ,  t h e Cour t  he ld  tha t
“[s ]t a t e sover eign  int er est s, . . . a r e  m ore pr operly protected by
procedura l sa fegua rds  inher ent  in th e str uctu re of the federa l
sys t em, th an  by judicially created  limita tions on federa l
power .”143
Jus t i ce Powell wrote a d i ss e nt ing opin ion in  th is cas e. H e
ar gued tha t  not  on ly was N ational L eague of Cities correct ly
decided, but  it a lso out line d wh en  an d if Congr es s  h as
overstepped  i ts  bounds. H e criticized Garcia for  r ender ing
Congr es siona l power limitless.144 As  a  r esu lt  of Garcia, th ere  is
a  gr ea t  de a l of con fusion  and  con t roversy regard ing  the lim it s of
Congress’ power . This  lack of direction ha s proven t o be
pr oblema tic for  the  Cour t ,  and in  subsequent de cisions, t he
Cou r t  has  r et reated from its position and the seemingly harsh
effect  of Garcia. Appellees in  Am os did not ar gue that Congress
does not  ha ve the p ower t o app ly th e ADA to sta te p ris ons in
light  of the d ecision in Garcia. H owever , a  carefu l examin a t ion
of subsequent case law suggests tha t  Garcia may  be  on  i t s way
ou t . J ust ice R eh nqu is t  a lso wr ote a  diss en t in g opin ion  in
Garcia, sta ting t ha t t he pr inciples descr ibed in  Nat iona l League
of Cities wil l “aga in  command th e su ppor t of a m ajorit y of th is
Cour t .”145 The fi r st  ind ica t ion  of th e Cou r t ’s in ten t ion  to cla r ify
its  position with r egard  to Congress’ powers came wh en t hey
re visit ed Garcia in Gregory v. Ashcroft.146 There , t he  Cour t
noted  tha t  Garcia limit s “our  abilit y to consider  th e limit s t ha t
the sta te-federal ba lance places on Congress’ powers un der t he
Com mer ce Clau se,” and  st at ed t ha t “[a]pplicat ion of the p lain
s ta tement  ru le t hu s m ay a void a  poten t ia l  cons t itu t iona l
pr oblem.”147
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148. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Congress enacted the Low-level Radioactive Waste
Pol icy Amendmen ts, which att empt ed t o force each stat e to mak e its own
ar rangemen t s for d isp osin g of t he  low-le vel r ad ioa cti ve w as te  it  gen er at ed.  Th e a ct
tried  to fo rce  com pli an ce t hr ou gh  th re e d iffere nt  in cent ives . Th e st at e of Ne w York
att acked the st atu te as being violative of the Ten th Amen dm ent .  The cour t  found  tha t
the “t ake  t it l e” incen t ive d id  viol a t e t he  Ten th  Amendmen t ,  hence,  Jus tice  O’Connor ’s
s t a t emen t  above. Alth ough Garcia deals with apply in g a genera lly applicable federal
s t a tu t e (FLSA), and New Y ork deals w it h  a  s t a te r egu lat ory  fun ction , th e Cou rt ’s
dis cus sion  of the issu es is similar if not identical regardless of this difference.
149. Id . at  161 (alte ra tion in  origina l) (quoting H odel v. Virginia  Sur face Minin g
& Rec la ma ti on  Ass ’n, 45 2 U .S.  264 , 28 8 (19 81).
150. 117 S . C t . 2365 (1997). Th is ca se d ea lt w ith  th e Br ad y Bill ’s pr ovisi on
r e q u ir ing local  law  en force me nt  officials  to con du ct b ack gr oun d ch eck s on  gu n
purchasers.  The coun ty sh eriff in Ra valli Coun ty, Mont an a objected t o this
r equ ir emen t c la iming  tha t  unde r  New York , t he  gove rnmen t  cou ld  not for ce them to
do these ba ckground checks. In a five-to-four decision, the Suprem e Cour t  held  tha t
loca l officials d o not h ave t o perfor m t hes e check s for t he fed era l govern men t. 
The first case t o effectively begin wh it t l ing away a t  Garcia
was New York  v.  Uni ted  S tates.148 Jus t i ce  O’Connor  wrote  the
majority  opinion and su mmed it up by stating tha t “Congress
may not  s imply  ‘commande e[r ] the le gis la t ive  pr ocesse s of t he
Sta tes  by dir ectly comp ellin g th em  to ena ct an d enforce a
fed er a l r egu latory  p rogram. ’”149 This decision suggests that
Congress can not  compel st at e officials  to ca r ry  ou t  ce r ta in
ad min ist ra tive  task s—s uch as,  in  th is  case , a pp lica t ion  of th e
ADA to state prisons. By applying the Act to stat e p r isons , the
federal  govern men t would be “commande er in g” st a te p r ison
res ources  and,  in  effect , d ir ect in g t heir  a lloca t ion .
Recen tly,  th e Court  ha s exten ded th e ru le fr om N ew  Y or k
even fur ther  by n ot  a llow in g Con gr es s t o compel a  s t a t e
govern men t’s  exe cu t ive  bran ch to  perform cer t a i n
ad min ist ra tive  funct ions  in  Printz v. United S tates.1 5 0 The
s itua t ion  in  Printz is  som ewhat  simila r  to the a pp lica t ion  of th e
ADA to s ta te p r isons . In  Printz, the Su prem e Court  rea lized
tha t  th rough  the Brad y Bill, Congres s is es sen tia lly tellin g
sta tes  how t o us e t heir  la w enforce men t  res ources . If t he
officers  were r equired  to do the ba ckground checks r equired  by
the Bra dy Bill, th ere  would u nd oubt edly be a n in crea se in
paperwork, st a tes  wou ld  need t o h ir e m ore officers to offset
t hose doing t he ch eck s,  and i t  wou ld  requir e r ea lloca t ing
officers  according to needs around each stat e. These
consequ ences di rect ly e ffect  how and where s t a tes  use the ir  l aw
enforcement  resources. In applying the ADA to state prisons,
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151. Id . at  2377 (quotin g TH E  F E D E R A L I S T NO .  15 (Alexander Hamilton) and U.S.
Te rm Lim it s, I nc.  v. T ho rn ton , 51 4 U .S.  779 , 83 8 (19 95)).
152. U.S . CO N S T . a me nd . XIV,  § 5. S ect ion  5 of t he  Fo ur te en th  Ame ndmen t
states: “The Con gress  sha ll have  power t o enforce, by a ppropr iat e legisla tion , th e
p rov is ions of t h is  a r t ic le .” Id .
153. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). The Supr eme C ou r t  h e ld that Congress cannot use
i t s Fou rt een th  Ame nd me nt  en force me nt  powe rs  to d et er  local  gover nm en ts  from
un int ent ionally  bu rd en ing  re ligiou s fr eed om.
154. Id . at 2159.
Congr ess  is es sen tia lly doing t he  sa me  th ing.  S ta te cor rect iona l
officials  would  ha ve to reallocate funds , guar ds, an d ma ybe
even pr isoners t o accommodat e th e guidelines of the st at ut e.
The st ronges t  a rgu men t  pos ed  by J ust ice S ca lia , wr it in g for
the ma jor i ty in Printz, dea ls  wit h  the s ep ara t ion  and b a la nce of
powers between the federal and stat e government s. In
ana lyzing the natu re of this separat ion, Ju stice Scalia stated:
[T]h e  F ra mer s  r e j ect e d  the  concep t  o f a  cen t r a l  gove rnm en t
t h a t  w ou l d a ct  u p on  a n d  t h r ou g h  th e  S ta t e s [a s  h a d t h e
Ar t i c le s  of Con fed er a tion ], an d in st ea d d esign ed a  sys te m  in
w h ich  the  s t a t e  an d  f ede ra l  gove rnm en t s  wou ld  exe rc i se
con cu r r e n t au t ho r i ty  ove r t h e pe ople —w h o we re , in  H am ilton ’s
words , “the  on ly p rop e r  ob ject s  o f gove rnmen t , ”.  . .  . The  g rea t
in n ova tion  of th is  design  w a s  t h a t  “o u r  ci t iz e n s  w ou l d  h a v e  t w o
poli tica l capac i t i e s , one  s t a t e  a nd  one  f ede ra l ,  each  p ro tec t ed
from  in cur sion  by t h e ot h er .”151
Hen ce, the  federa l government  is  limit ed to i t s enumera ted
powers an d mu st n ot encroach on st at e power in order  to
effectua te its  goals. In  light  of the Cou rt ’s r ecent  decision in
Printz  it a ppea rs  th at  core st at e fun ctions , su ch a s pr ison
man agement, should be left completely to the sta tes.
One d is t inct ion  tha t  war ran t s not ice  is  tha t  in  Garcia and
Printz, th e issues d ealt wit h Congress ’ power u nder  the
Commer ce Clause. The ADA was passed under Congress’
Com mer ce Claus e power an d under  § 5  of t he  Four t een th
Amendmen t .152 Recently, in City  of B oern e v.  Flores ,153 t he
Supreme Cour t  de-cided tha t § 5 power is not u nlimit ed. The
Cou r t  rea son ed  tha t  the Reli giou s F reedom  Rest ora t ion  Act  of
1993 (RFRA), “is n ot  a  pr ope r  exe rcise of Congr es s’ § 5
enforcement  power because it  contradicts vital principles
necessa ry to main ta in  separa t ion  of powers  and  the federa l-
s t a t e bala nce.”154 In  th e m ajor ity opin ion, J u s tice Kennedy
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155. Id . at  2162 (qu otin g Mar bur y v. Madison , 5 U .S.  (1 Cr an ch) 1 37,  176  (180 3)).
156. S ee id. 
157. S ee Bet he a v . Cr ou se , 41 7 F .2d  504  (10t h C ir . 19 69).
158. Hill  v. Estelle, 537 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir . 1976) (dealing with  claims by
pr isone r s wh er ein  th ey a lle ged  de pr iva ti on  of th eir  civil  ri gh ts ).
159. S ee Brooks  v. Wain wrigh t, 428  F.2d  652, 653 (5th Cir .  1970)  (s ta t ing tha t
ha i r cu t  an d sh avin g regu lat ions in a  sta te pr ison do not  violate a  prison er’s right  to
free exercise of religion, freedom of expression, or due pr ocess of law). The Hill  cour t
justified this holding by noting tha t “[t]he grooming regulations . . . were ap plied to
all  prisoners, regar dless of religion or ra ce, and thu s ther e was  no den ia l  of  equa l
prot ection .” Hill , 537 F.2d at 215.
rea soned th at  “[t]he ju dicial au thor i ty to dete rmine  the
cons t it u t iona li t y of laws , in cases and controversies, is based on
the p rem i se that  the ‘powers of the legislature ar e defined and
limited; and  tha t  t hose lim it s m ay n ot  be  mis taken , or
forgotten , the cons tit ut ion is w rit te n.’”155 Inasmuch  as  the
management of s t a te p r isons  i s a  core stat e function, Congress’
power  to a br ogat e t his  fun ction u nd er  th e ADA is limit ed. City
of Boerne re inforces  th is conclus ion in  th e § 5 conte xt. 156
In  light  of the r ecent  decisions  in Printz  a nd City of Boerne,
it  seems  as  though  the Supr eme Cour t is limit ing th e federal
government’s power with regard to stat e functions and ent ities.
This  is sign ificant  in t he s ta te p ris on conte xt beca us e it
sugges t s tha t  the S upr em e Cour t  wil l be  hard p res se d t o a llow
applica t ion  of th e ADA un der eit her  Commer ce Clause powers
or  under  § 5  of t he  Four t een th  Amendmen t .
a. Application of the Constitu tion and  other federal
statutes. One might  ar gue th at  th e ADA d oes not  u su rp s t a t e
power anymore than  does compliance wit h  the Const it u t ion  or
other fe de r al statut es that  may be applied to state prisons.
While  th i s i s a  l audable a rgu men t , t he ca se  la w e it her  doe s n ot
squ ar ely address  it  (a s  in  the  case of federa l stat ut ory law)
and/or  it d oes not  st rip  st at e power  (as wit h const itu tion ally
protected  powers). It is well-settled tha t  a  person  does  not
check  his constit ut ional right s at  th e prison gat e.157 However , it
is also well-established that  “l awfu l  i nca rce ra t ion  r e su l ts in  the
necessa ry limit at ion of man y pr ivileges a nd  rights of the
ord ina ry citizen .”158 For example, a prisoner’s First  Amendment
righ t s m ay be infringed upon for th e sak e of prison sa fety
regulations.159 The Supreme Cou r t  has sta ted tha t prison
regu la t ion s th at  infr inge  on a  pr isone r’s cons tit ut iona l righ ts
will be up held  whe n “it is r eas ona bly rela ted  to legit ima te
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160. Turn er  v. S afe ly, 4 82 U .S. 7 8, 89  (198 7). On e ex am ple  of “pen ologica l
interests” includes limited v is i t a tion rights afforded prisoners. In Bazzetta v.
McGinnis , 902 F. Supp. 765 (E.D. Mich. 1995), the court st ated, “[c]onvicted
pr isone r s . . . have no absolute, unfett e r ed  const i t u t iona l r i gh t  t o un res t r ic t ed
visi ta tion  with an y person, regardless of whether  th a t  p e r son is  a fa mi ly m em ber  or
no t .” Id . a t 7 69.  (cit in g Be lla my  v. B ra dle y, 7 29 F .2d  416 , 42 0 (6t h C ir . 19 84)).
161. 408 U. S. 4 71 (1 972 ).
162. S ee id . at 481.
163. 29 U. S.C . §§ 20 1-21 9 (19 94).
164. 29 F. 3d  682  (D.C . Ci r.  199 4).
165. Id . at 684.
166. Id . at 686.
pe nologica l int er est s.”160 Fu r ther , in Morri ssey v. B rewer, the
Supreme Cour t out lined th e sta nda rd for app lying Fourt eent h
Amendment  privileges to prisoner s.1 6 1  The Cour t  r easoned tha t
due process applies only if the ques tioned governm ent  act ion  is
likely to cau se t he  pla int iff to suffer  a “grievou s loss.”162 This
ap plicat ion of t he  Four t een th  Amendmen t  seems  wa te red down
compared to tha t  a fforded  to t he  gene ra l pu blic. Althou gh
p r is on er s a re a fforde d t heir  const it u t ion a l r igh t s,  a lbe it  to a
limited  exten t  compara t ively, one  cannot  a rgue tha t  the  ADA
fits  in to th is  sa me ca tegor y. Th e ADA is  not  a  const it u t ion a l
r igh t , hence, it  cann ot be treat ed as such and a pplie d
au tomat ica l ly .
Federa l stat utes do n ot  enjoy the sa me br oad scope of
ap plicat ion as constit ut ional right s. Hen ce, one  must  look  to the
language of t he  st a tu t e  t o det e rmine  when  and  to w h om  it is
app licable. One of th e federal st at ut es th at  ha s been r eviewed
in  th e pr ison cont ext is  the Fa ir Labor Stan dards Act  (FL SA). 163
The FLSA, among other t hings, s et s th e feder al m inim um  wa ge
stan dard.  Man y of th e compla ints  filed by prisoner s dea l with
th i s as pect of th e Act. The m ain  issu e before t he cour ts  is
whet her  th e FLSA applies to prisoners. In Henthorn v.
Departm en t of Navy 164 th e cour t n oted th at  “[t]he Act pr ovides
gener ally unhe lpfu l  de fin it ions of its  crit ical t er ms .”165
However , th e cour t a tt empt s to mesh  th eories from other
de cis ion s and decides to dr aw  th e lin e a t p ub lic vers us  pr ivat e
contr acts. This m ean s th at  if the pr isoner “has  freely contr acted
with a  non-prison em ployer to sell  his  labor ,” th en  he d oes h ave
employee stat us under  the FLSA.166 However , if the  “inm at e ’s
la bor  is  compe lle d a nd/or  wh er e a ny com pe nsa t ion  h e receives
is set  a n d pa id  by h is  cust odian , t he p r isoner  is  ba r red  from
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ L A N _F I N . W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
908 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
167. Id . at  686-8 7; see also Gambe t ta  v. Pr ison Re ha bilita tive I ndu s. &
Diversified En te r. , 11 2 F .3d  111 9, 1 124  (11t h C ir . 19 97) (s t a t i n g tha t  “inma tes  who
wor k for state prison industries are not covered by the FLSA”); Vanskike v. Peters,
974 F.2d  806 (7th  Cir. 19 92); Miller v. Du ka kis, 96 1 F.2d  7 (1st Cir . 1992); Gilbrea th
v. Cu tt er  Biol ogica l In c., 9 31 F .2d  132 0 (9t h C ir . 19 91).
asser t ing a cla im u nd er  th e FL SA, sin ce he is  de fin it ely  not  an
‘em ployee.’”167 The  court  does n ot sp ecify whet her  th is applies
to stat e prisoners. Even if this stat ute applies to stat e
prisoners, t he  ou tcome does n ot u su rp  st at e a ut hor ity.
Fu rt her more, it  doe s n ot  ups et  the ba la nce of power between
the st at e an d feder al govern men t. S ta te p ris on  officia ls  can  se t
the wages at whatever they deem n ecessa ry and  appropr ia t e
according to their budgets.
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 The Cour t  in  Amos correct ly held  th at  th e ADA does not
ap ply to st at e pr isons . Their  rea sonin g is sound a nd su pport ed
by case  la w or  key con ces sions t h roughout the circuits and in
the Su pr em e Cour t . Th e cle a r  st a tem en t  doct r ine in voked in
Amos opera t e s t o avoid  se r iou s con st it u t ion a l qu es t ion s such  as
whet her  or  not  Congress  has the  power  to apply the ADA to
s t a t e pr isons . As  s u ch ,  it  i s an  in t egra l pa r t  of s t a tu tory
cons t ruct ion  in tha t  it  facially identifies Congress’ intent so
th er e is  no confu sion as t o the s cope  or  app lica t ion  of a s t a t u t e.
There is  no exp lici t  men t ion  of s t a t e p r isons  in  the
ADA—su ggest ing th at  Congr ess n ever  int end ed for it  t o apply
in  tha t  cont ext . Notwithst anding t he a mbiguous langu age of
the ADA with  r ega rd  to stat e prisons, application of this statut e
to st at e corr ection al fa cilities  in ligh t of r ecen t  deci sions
regard ing federalism would usurp a  power  t r ad it iona l ly
reser ved to sta tes, n am ely the opera tion an d ma na geme n t  of
s t a t e prisons. This abr ogat ion of power wou ld  go aga ins t  the
Fram e rs’ inten t t o strike a  balan ce between st at e an d federal
powers.
As th is  is su e is  one of gr ea t  im por t  and  deba te th roughout
t h e circuit s, it  will m ost lik ely be gr an te d cer tior ar i by th e
Unit ed St at es Su pr eme  Cour t. In  th e even t t ha t it  doe s,  if t he
Cou r t  cont inu es t o ret ur n t o th e roots  of the Con st itu tion , as  in
Printz, th e only conclusion t ha t will su ffice is t o uph old th e
stat es’ pow er s a nd t o not  app ly t he ADA to st a te p r isons. If,
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however, the Court reverts back to its Garcia lin e of r ea son ing ,
the on ly way tha t  th e ADA cou ld poss ib ly  app ly  to s t a t e
cor rect ion a l facilitie s is if Con gre ss clea r ly  st a t e s i t s i nt en t  t o
effectua t e th is end. Sh ould th is occur, one would hope t h a t
Congress would also appr opriat e fu n d s t o as sist  st at es in
com p ly in g with  the  regu la t ions  so as  not  to burden  sta tes  who
are alr ead y st ru ggling t o find inn ovat ive an d cost-effective  wa ys
to house and reh abilitat e prisoners.
T h e ADA is a lau dable at tem pt t o assist t hose who a re
disabled  in livin g norm al lives, inas mu ch as t his is possible.
However , i t  cannot be read or interpreted to include those
people who ha v e n o resp ect for society and find t hem selves
inca rce ra t ed becau se of th eir  disr ega rd  for th e la w. Ou r  funds
and a t t en t ion  are m ore r igh t fu lly  sp en t  on th ose who deserve a
hand in life, and n ot those wh o con t inua lly b it e  the hand  tha t
feeds them .
Jenn ifer  L . Lange
